

Desire, Negation and Creativity: Deleuze and Wittgenstein on the Creative Act

Emiliano La Licata

Abstract

In recent years, the Chomskian paradigm has been imposing its idea of linguistic creativity, associating creativity with calculus. However, the present paper develops the idea that the sphere of passion is connected with creativity. It provides an analysis of Deleuze's "Bartebly; or the Formula" about the relation between negation and creativity; and then, this discourse is developed through Wittgenstein's remarks on following a rule in *Philosophical Investigations*. The main idea of this paper is that, through the negation of the law (partially or totally), creative desire emerges as it finds before it a disordered space, undefined, which can be reorganized. In this disordered space, the creative passion more easily begins to reorganize the disorder of this space.

1. Introduction: desire and creativity

The Chomskian paradigm associates linguistic creativity with calculus. In Chomsky's late writings, phrase construction is left to a recursive computational operation, "Merge", which connects discrete parts of the language on the basis of features which further their composition (see Chomsky 1995). However, the following pages try to develop the idea that desire is linked to creativity. Deleuze claims that the creative act is tied to a "necessity", to a "need" (2007, 313). Elsewhere, he claims that creating and inventing concepts are activities bound with love or the feeling of friendship (see Deleuze & Guattari 1994): therefore he constitutes a link between creation, language and the sphere of desire. How then does language express the signs of an emerging *creative desire*?

As we know, in Deleuzian philosophy, desire "is what bears the offshoots of deterritorialization of assemblages or flight lines" and "opposes all strata of organization, the organism's organization as well as power organizations" (Deleuze 2007, 130). Therefore, in Deleuzian philosophy desire has this double function: on the

one hand, it opposes existing order; on the other, it encourages the possibility of following *new* paths. How then is creative desire – which is a process and an event (Deleuze 2007, 130) – channeled into language?

This article revolves around the central role of linguistic negation. On the one hand, negating the prescribed rule opens up an indeterminate land to the linguistic subject, a disordered land: *no man's land* (see Virno 2005, 37-42). On the other hand, it opens the door to creative passion that can set to work to modify or transform negated semantic order. By negating the rule before it, creative desire emerges as it faces an undefined, disordered space, which can be *reorganized*. It is no man's land, undefined by a regulated space which defines the borders of the meaningful and the unmeaningful and which narrows, thereby, the undefined to one symbolic order. By crossing this no man's land, creativity gets to work (see Virno 2010, 17). The crossing of this land gives creative desires the chance to work on something. In other words, refusing to follow a known route opens a *flexible space* to the subject: that space needs new organization, a new order. In this flexible space, creative desires can move more easily, can set to work to manipulate the plasticity of this space. Thus, the simple negation of the rule is not a sufficient condition to develop creativity. It is only the first step that leads to a disordered and flexible space. After crossing the line of negation, creative work – born out of desire – can start to construct a dynamic order against the background of that disordered space.

2. Linguistic creativity and calculus

Since the middle of the last century, Chomsky has been creating a link between linguistic creativity and calculus. Thus, he distances creativity from passion. In 1966 *Cartesian Linguistics*, Chomsky makes a decisive conceptual distinction with serious consequences. He distinguishes the creativity of linguistic use from the process that generates languages. The creativity of linguistic use is left to free will: human beings are free to use any linguistic expressions in any circumstances. Or, better still, the use

of one linguistic expression rather than another is determined neither by the stimuli coming from the environment, nor from the body (see Chomsky 2009, 60-61). Nevertheless, the creativity of linguistic use – the freedom of linguistic use – does not modify the form of the language at all:

For all his concern with the creative aspect of language use and with form as generative process, Humboldt does not go on to face the substantive question: what is the precise character of “organic form” in language. He does not, so far as I can see, attempt to construct particular generative grammars or to determine the general character of any such system, the universal schema to which any particular grammar conforms. In this respect, his work in general linguistics does not reach the levels achieved by some of his predecessors, as we shall see directly. His work is also marred by unclarity regarding several fundamental questions, in particular, regarding the distinction between the rule-governed creativity which constitutes the normal use of language and which does not modify the form of the language at all and the kind of innovation that leads to a modification in the grammatical structure of the language (Chomsky 2009, 75).

The creativity of linguistic use does not have creative effects on the general form of languages. The freedom of linguistic use does not generate, modify or change anything in the form of languages. As regards creativity of the form of the language – the generative capacity internal to the language – for many years Chomsky’s research program has developed the study of a universal grammar which is able to generate idioms. In his later writings, the generation of the languages is only left to one irreducible computational process called “Merge” (see Chomsky 1995). This process merges recursively discrete parts of the language according to features that make their composition possible. Chomsky imagines a Turing machine inside the body of the human being, which generates infinite phrases via recursive processes that compose discrete elements of the language:

Evidently, each language is the result of the interplay of two factors: the initial state and the course of experience. We can think of the initial state as a “language acquisition device” that takes experience as “input” and gives the language as an “output” – an “output” that is internally represented in the mind/brain. The input and the output are both open to examination: we can study the course of experience and the properties of the languages that are acquired. What is learned in this way can tell us quite a lot about the initial state that mediates between them (Chomsky 2000, 4).

The capacity to create new phrases and new meanings is associated with calculus in the way that a computational kernel works. “Merge” and also “Move” are the computational operations which permit the generation of infinite phrases starting from the lexicon introduced in that recursive machine. In every individual this recursive linguistic kernel generates an internal language L, which is then *freely* used by the performance systems. Therefore, according to Chomsky, first of all there is a computational kernel that generates, via recursive processes, language L internal to individuals. Then, there is the absolute creativity of the linguistic performance, which can freely use any phrases or expressions produced earlier by the computational kernel. It provides the material for the performance systems, material that is freely used in linguistic interactions. Regarding the creativity of linguistic use, Chomsky believes that at the moment it is a mystery of science which could be revealed in the future.

As already said, in Chomskian paradigm, linguistic creativity abandons passion and falls definitely into the domain of calculus. Furthermore, this recursive kernel is imagined inside the body, it is an organ of the body (see Hauser – Chomsky – Fitch 2002). This theoretical shift leads to naturalize calculus and to remove creativity from passion, since the body, traditionally place of the passions, is observed by this research program from the point of view of natural science.

3. Linguistic negation and chaos

Let us, however, imagine with Deleuze that there is a link between passion and creative activity. Creative passion desires to construct something new, or desires to modify something which already exists. What language then would this creative passion speak? How would it express itself? In other words, how would creative passion be rendered visible in language?

In the following pages, I would like to offer some remarks on the role of linguistic negation in relation to the possibility of creating. As the subject regards linguistic negation and creative desire, it seems to me that I should begin this discussion with Deleuze's *Bartleby* (1997).

Deleuze has shown the disruptive effects that linguistic negation produces. The formula "I would prefer not to", repeatedly pronounced by the copyist Bartleby, always undermines the symbolic order that his employer shows to him. Furthermore, it makes it impossible to return to his ordinary activities of copyist. The formula is particularly inspiring and also devastating, because on the one hand, it rejects the rule that is prescribed through a performative utterance; on the other, it makes the rule totally impossible. Indeed, the formula does not reject one rule to accept another or to return to the usual activities. It is not a negation which leads us to conclude that it could do something else, that it could return to ordinary things or could conduct a battle against the rule. The formula rejects the rule and at the same time accepts nothing else: this situation creates an "expanding zone of indiscernibility or indetermination between some non-preferred activities and a preferable activity" (Deleuze 1997, 71). It is like the annihilation of any will, which throws everything into *chaos*. The formula does not want to conduct a battle to subvert the rule, but rather it annihilates any of its effects and any other alternative to it. So Bartleby sits still and watches semantic disorder open up in front of him, disorder into which he has thrown away any symbolic order that is present in his life:

I would prefer nothing rather than something: not a will to nothingness, but a growth of a nothingness of the will. Bartebly has won the right to survive, that is, to remain immobile and upright before a blind wall (Deleuze 1997, 71).

Bartebly repeats that formula ten times and creates a constantly increasing spiral of chaos, which swallows and annihilates all, and into which he throws away both the rule that he always has to follow, and any other earlier activities. That formula has the same effects of “The Blob,”¹ which feeds itself every time that a rule is negated and any shared rationalities are banned. Alternatively, playing with metaphors, it is a black hole that every time it grows attracts every law of the Cosmos – every existential rule shared up until that moment:

The formula I PREFER NOT TO excludes all alternatives and devours what it claims to conserve no less that it distances itself everything else. It implies that Bartebly stop copying, that is, that he stop reproducing words; it hollows out a zone of indetermination that renders word indistinguishable that create a vacuum within language [*langage*]. But it also stymies the speech acts that a boss uses to command, that a kind friend uses to ask questions or a man of faith to make promises. If Bartebly had refused, he could still be seen as a rebel or insurrectionary, and as such would still have a social role. But the formula stymies all speech acts, and at the same time, it makes Bartebly a pure outsider [*exclu*] to whom no social position can be attributed (Deleuze 1997, 73).

In this essay Deleuze also concentrates on a mirror image of Bartebly: Achab, Bartebly’s alter ego. Bartebly is an innocent victim of the law he rejects, while Achab is the conscious destroyer of the law he rejects. In negating the rule, Bartebly, immobile and harmless, simply shows both the mediocrity of any laws and the chaos hiding itself behind every rational form. Achab betrays the law and also works to destroy all rational order that surrounds him, endangering the life of those who are following him. Bartebly simply shows with innocence the semantic chaos that hides

itself right behind any rule; Achab brutally drags reality to that chaos, with known and tragic consequences. Against the background of these mirror figures, there are those who follow the rules, who are definitely the guarantors of the existing symbolic order. Nevertheless, they are influenced by Achab and Barteby too. Indeed, they are attracted and fascinated by these figures, even if they fear Achab and are disoriented and worried by Barteby. They are very interesting in this discussion, since they are those people who, on the one hand, follow tradition – the laws – but on the other are fascinated by the chaos and try to modify their surrounding reality. They oscillate between the law, the desire to change it and the attempts to do so.² To varying degrees they bring out the creative desire that every legalism tries to stem. They are neither victim of the sacrifice of Barteby, nor of the destructiveness of Achab, but more modestly they try laboriously to reconcile the denial of the law with the desire to create. By having discovered this chaotic dimension, they reject any immovable, rigid, eternal and metaphysical order. Thus, their new perspective is dynamic order, the fluctuating order that has semantic regularities willing to be changed. All this leads to pluralism, to the differentiation and to the coexistence of dynamic orders:

It is first of all the affirmation of a world in *process*, an *archipelago*. Not even a puzzle, whose pieces when fitted together would constitute a whole, but rather a wall of loose, uncemented stones, where every element has a value in itself but also in relation to others: isolated and floating relations, islands and straits, immobile points and sinuous lines – for Truth always has “jagged edges” (Deleuze 1997, 86).

Negation opens the door, on the one hand, to the possibility of removing a rule, a symbolic order, which is sometimes metaphysical; on the other hand, it opens the door to the desire to create something against the background of that *Chaos* hiding itself in the shadow of the *Law*. Once the chaotic dimension is discovered and once any metaphysical order is removed, there is the possibility to construct contingent and

dynamic orders which differentiate themselves. They always renew themselves, constantly making corrections or revolutions if appropriate.

4. Following a rule, the leap in the dark and the paradoxical situation

Through Deleuze some concepts have been presented, which are useful to draw a philosophical line that attempts to link creative desire with language. Linguistic negation lays the foundations to discover the undefined. Through negation, suspension of hard rationality takes place, thereby opening the door to the possibility of construction and reconstruction of semantic order. In this and in the next paragraphs I wish to investigate Deleuzian concepts through a reading of some pages of late Wittgenstein. I am aware that it is really difficult comparing or even connecting two philosophers who are so different in philosophical tradition and style. However, the purpose behind these remarks is to follow a line of reasoning that tries to develop the idea that negation is linked to the creative processes. Therefore, the imaginary dialogue between Wittgenstein and Deleuze, which is pursued in these remarks, has to be restricted to the present line of thinking.

In the *Philosophical Investigations* paragraphs that are dedicated to the theme of following a rule (Wittgenstein 2009, §§ 185-241), Wittgenstein imagines a pupil who cannot do his homework by the prescribed rule. He is unable to not because he is insufficiently trained or because he does not really understand the rule, or because he is rebelling against the rule, but simply because, in doing so, he behaves differently from what we expect, from what we are used to observing. This pupil, even if unintentionally and maybe unconsciously, negates the rule and turns his back on habitual behavior that is considered correct and normal in executing the rule. This pupil can reasonably be named Barteby, Wittgenstein's Barteby. On one hand, through his bizarre answer he destabilizes the performative of the teacher "add 2 up to 1000" (Wittgenstein 2009, § 185); on the other hand, he behaves in a way that has no justification or explanation, despite the teacher, who wishes to put him on the right

track. The behavior of Wittgenstein's Barteby prevents any return to the known order. Indeed, his actions cannot be corrected in any way:

... this person finds it natural, once given our explanations, to understand our order as we would understand the order "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000, and so on".

This case would have similarities to that in which it comes naturally to a person to react to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction from fingertip to wrist, rather than from wrist to fingertip (Wittgenstein 2009, § 185).

This situation puts the teacher and his rationale into a predicament and forces him to think about the processes through which a rule is applied. Therefore, on the one hand, Wittgenstein's Barteby annihilates the rationale of the rule; on the other, he confuses the teacher, forcing him to think about the process that links the rule to its application. Furthermore, there is no chance for the teacher to bring things back on a familiar track. Wittgenstein's Barteby is not a rebel, as he does not want to oppose teacher's rule. He is not mad, as he is able to engage in a dialogue with the teacher; he completely understands the teacher's rationale, it is just that he does not behave as we would expect. He is not in bad faith and he does not want to lie or even worse trick the teacher. He innocently performs actions, which are different from what the rule imagines. Simply and innocently he makes the same move as Deleuze's Barteby who, from one standpoint, annihilates known rationale and, from another, opens the door to devouring semantic chaos, which lies right behind the rationale for any rules, for any performative. Nothing is going to be the same after the destabilizing behavior of Wittgenstein's Barteby. Indeed, this theoretical expedient – the new Barteby – permits Wittgenstein to introduce a discourse about the relationship that links a rule with its contingent application. And this discourse has important consequences for the relationship between chaos and creativity. Indeed, the behavior of the next Barteby permits Wittgenstein to ask the following question: what is the relationship between the declaration of the rule and its real and contingent application in a new case? In the

discourse that follows, Wittgenstein strives in to disconnect any deterministic links between the declaration of the rule and a new contingent application (see Wright 1981; Budd 1984; McDowell 1984). The execution of the rule does not determine any actions that it prescribes. It is philosophical mythology to think that the application of a rule can in some way be magically contained in its declaration: “add 2 up to 1000”. By excluding or loosening any determining nexus between the rule and its application, Wittgenstein’s *Bartebly* opens a *hiatus* between rule and use (see Virno 2005, 37-42). This hiatus is no man’s land; within that land, any rationality is devoured by semantic chaos. This *hiatus* is the black hole that attracts and annihilates any laws or rules and their execution.

In interpreting these passages, Kripke claims that, according to Wittgenstein, every time a rule is ready to be applied, a *leap in the dark* is made (1982). This leap in the dark consists in having no knowledge to establish in advance how the rule will be applied in a new case. Wittgenstein’s theoretical position is really radical: in a new application of the rule, there is no knowledge that can tell us in advance what will happen when the rule is applied in a new case. The knowledge of past occurrences of the application of the rule does not determine in advance a new use. Even if we could immediately observe all past applications of the rule, it would not tell us anything about its future use (Wittgenstein 2009, §§ 191-192-197). In the same way, the declaration or understanding of the rule does not determine any application (Wittgenstein 2009, §§ 186-188-197). So every time that the rule is applied, it makes a *leap in the dark*: there is no knowledge that can determine in advance what will happen in the future when the rule is applied. This leap in the dark leads us to the land opened up by *Bartebly*: this undefined place where any rationale is annihilated. This condition could lead to the immobilizing of Deleuze’s *Bartebly*, to the impossibility of movement, since there are no reference points; indeed, everything is undefined: a growing disorder. This *no man’s land* is splendidly depicted by Wittgenstein in paragraph 201 of *Philosophical Investigations*:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The answer was: if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here (Wittgenstein 2009, § 201).

Semantic chaos that enshrouds and swallows everything in an uncontrollable way is depicted by Wittgenstein with a paradoxical situation. He imagines a situation in which, relationships between rule and applications are lessened and all behavior can be brought into accordance or conflict with a rule. Wittgenstein imagines a place where there is no longer a criterion of correctness, since what is described correct in one moment, is then described incorrect in the next. What is described true in one moment, becomes false in the next and so on: a place that is immobile, since everything is correct and incorrect, true and false at the same time; a place where there is neither accordance nor conflict with the rule. However, it is a place which also opens up a space of freedom because, if the constriction of the rule is lessened or removed, it can move in very different directions from those suggested by the execution of the law: it opens *flight lines* from the rule.

5. Decision, semantic disorder and creativity

A rule does not determine any behavior in advance. In a new application of the rule, a leap in the dark is made, where everything is undefined and at the same time correct and incorrect. If you do not want to stay for a long in that *paradoxical* place, you have to *do* something. What then is it necessary to do to get out of that place? There is a point to be crossed between the declaration of the rule and its application. If you want to cross this middle area and therefore leave it temporarily, according to Wittgenstein, you have to make a more or less *creative choice* (Wittgenstein 2009, § 186). The choice consists in deciding, on one extreme, whether to exhibit behavior that repeats applications of the rule considered correct and orthodox: in this way, you become a

defender of the rule. On the other extreme, you decide whether to reject the rule, to absolutely deny it: behavior *a là* Bartebly/Achab. In the middle of these two extremes, there are some positions which involve the creativity of the speakers to varying degrees. You can show behavior that flexibly accepts the rule, behavior that tries to modify it or that follows it partly and then develops something else, etc. etc.: you can follow *bifurcations* starting from the known route of the rule. In other words, there are varying degrees of accepting the rule which can lead to its total denial or modification. And the choice made is visible *in* the use of the rule: in the way it is applied. I clarify this point to avoid the idea that the decision of how to apply the rule is a super-rational or super-conscious process. Very complex dynamics play a role in the decision making process. According to Wittgenstein, following a rule can be associated with a custom (Wittgenstein 2009, § 205) – a practice (Wittgenstein 2009, § 202), a technique (Wittgenstein 2009, § 199) that are socially recognized and handed down (see Kripke 1982). The decision which commits a subject to follow a rule is linked therefore with social processes that are not reducible to an individual's psychology. And, in any case, according to Wittgenstein, real and contingent application of the rule is the *only* way to see how you have decided to use it, since, as we know, he refuses any psychological reductionism (see Ter Hark 1990; Cimatti 2007). In other words, according to Wittgenstein, the hiatus created between rule and future application is not filled with the *decision* of how to follow the rule, but rather with the way you *perform* a rule (or the way you transform or reject it); and this clearly expresses what you have decided to do.

Now, denying the rule (to varying degrees) on a new occasion of use means opening the door to semantic disorder, to a disordered and plastic space within which *creative desire* can build its temporary home. In semantic disorder, in no man's land, there is a kind of suspension of the rationale that the rule prescribes. So disorder appears on the scene. In this way, *creative desire* can be channeled into the construction of a dynamic order and can begin to respond. In other words, negating the rule opens the

door to semantic disorder. And the passion linked with creativity can start working to construct something. Of course this new order created against the background of chaos is *precarious and dynamic*, it is willing to evolve, to change and to differentiate itself.

6. “The rule according to which he proceeds”: creativity of meaning

In this paragraph I wish to show the repercussions and consequences of this discourse in Wittgenstein’s late semantics. What consequences are there every time we use a meaning and we have the possibility to perform actions within a space of freedom which lies between the rule and its application? Conscious of the chaos lying in the shadow of each rule, semantics abandons its immobile and eternal character and becomes more dynamic, more open to *differentiation*.

In paragraph 79 of the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein asks what is the meaning of “N” in the statement “N is dead”? To give a meaning to “N”, a language theory can use many strategies: the meaning of “N” can be a concept, an object of reality, a perception of reality, a psychological object, a neurological configuration etc., etc. according to the scheme or rule Word → Meaning (whatever it could be). It assumes that by pronouncing that phrase the rule that binds W with M is present to the speaker. It assumes that in stating the phrase the speaker is aware on some conscious level of the rule that makes a link between word and meaning. The speaker already knows the meaning of the words when he uses them, as, in some way, he knows the rule that links words with meaning.

In paragraph 79 Wittgenstein asks whether really, in linguistic use, a rule that rigidly binds a word with a meaning limits us to a determined use; whether it is possible that a rule, stored in the speaker’s mind, determines our behavior when we pronounce statements like “N is dead”. Let us admit that the meaning of “N” is a closed container with all descriptions which define the boundaries of “N”. Let us admit that these

descriptions are all I know about Mr. N. However, Wittgenstein continues, if by mistake some of these descriptions are false, if it is discovered that some descriptions which frame the meaning of “N” are wrong, is perhaps the statement “N is dead” false? It is certainly not false if N is really dead. Indeed, if someone notices that some descriptions that frame the meaning of “N” according to the rule $W \rightarrow M$ are false, the individual who pronounces that phrase can change them at the time, can invent new meanings, can work on the descriptions of meaning within the situation. He can then work without meanings previously set by the rule $W \rightarrow M$. Furthermore, let us imagine that neuroscientists have demonstrated incontrovertibly that when I pronounce “N is dead” the same areas of the brain always become activated, it could then be thought that the meaning of “N is dead” is a cerebral state “S”. Let’s put the case that when I pronounce “N is dead” twice, the same areas of the brain become active: the cerebral configuration “S” is therefore the meaning of the phrase “N is dead”. However, it could be possible that on one occasion I pronounce the phrase with the intent to refer to Mr. N’s death, but another time meaning “My PC does not work any more”, or with any other meanings I invent at the time. Therefore Wittgenstein asks, in all these cases, what is “the rule according to which he proceeds?” (Wittgenstein 2009, § 82). In the above cases, it is difficult to recognize a rule that determines the meaning of an expression. Descriptions defining “N” could be false, or replaced or invented at the time, and yet the meaning of “N is dead” is not influenced. Even if there were a neurological configuration that is activated every time that we pronounce a word or a phrase, the meaning of the word or the phrase would anyway be ruled by its use in the context of language game.

This pattern $W \rightarrow M$ that links a word with a meaning by a rule, is it really *decisive* in establishing the meaning of an expression? Is the meaning of an expression really established in this way? As we know from the very first paragraph of *Philosophical Investigation*, Wittgenstein shoots his philosophical arrows against the semantic pattern $W \rightarrow M$ (Wittgenstein 2009, § 1). He points to the circumstances of the

language game as the place to look in order to understand how the meaning of an expression is established. He moves towards the idea that there are *semantic regularities* in some expressions used in determined contexts and circumstances which can be observed. Furthermore, expressions do not refer to an object called “Meaning” that is located elsewhere, in a third Fregean realm or in a Cartesian private place (see Kenny 2006, 13; 141-159), but meaning is *embodied* in semantic gestures (see Fabbrichesi Leo 2000; Fortuna 2002; Virno 2003, 91-110), in semantic moves that are promptly performed in language games.³ It is unnecessary to think of another place where the meaning of expressions reside. Phrases are meaningful, as they are moves of a game: even the utterances are semantic gestures performed in language game contexts (see Wittgenstein 2009, § 435; Wittgenstein 1967, §§ 158-159; Gargani 2008, 1-25; Gebauer 2009, 75-105).

7. Conclusion

Through the examples reported, it can be seen that, according to Wittgenstein, a rule is not constrictive; there is that space of freedom called no man’s land, which is arrived at every time a rule is prepared for use. Within this undefined space which presents itself, creativity can get to work; the results of this work can be observed in the way in which the rule is applied (or transformed). Therefore, rejecting a metaphysical idea of semantics, Wittgenstein arrives at the idea that there are *embodied* semantic regularities, which can be observed within language games. Observed *semantic regularities* are fluid. As already seen, behind visible and describable regularity there is that no man’s land, in which change can be experimented. In other words, although contingent semantic regularities can be observed within language games, there is always that space with indefinable borders, within which all established relations are released and which is thus open to experimentation. Thus, for example, in the statement “N is dead”, it is possible that one description is false because a mistake has been made. Should that *determine* the falsity of the statement “N is dead”? Of course not. It is possible that during linguistic

interaction someone points out that the description is false, and it can then be changed or modified. Therefore Wittgenstein claims: in these cases, “I use the name “N” without a *fixed* meaning” (Wittgenstein 2009, § 79). In language game construction things sometimes move around without fixed meanings, established *a priori*; sometimes these meanings are created at the time, on the basis of circumstances. Advantage is taken therefore of that space freedom which is between the rule and its application to transform meaning. A metaphor for this space is described in *Philosophical Investigations* paragraph 83. Wittgenstein describes a situation in which some men are gathering to play with a ball in a field:

starting various existing games, but playing several without finishing them, and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one another with the ball, throwing it at one another for a joke, and so on (Wittgenstein 2009, § 83).

It is easy to see this situation when one observes children playing: they often spend a long time in establishing which game they are playing, and thus they are used to changing rules and behavior very quickly. This state of uncertainty in which they are throwing the ball at one another for a joke or chasing one another aimlessly, where the game is not limited by rigidly applied rules, is what I would like to reveal. It is that state of disorder and temporary suspension of any constraining rules, which has been discussed previously. This is the state that probably opens the door to *Deleuzian creative desire*, to the possibility of experimentation and the construction of new meanings, which in Wittgenstein’s and Deleuze’s terms means developing new modes of existence and new forms of life.⁴

REFERENCES

Budd, M., 1984. "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Interpretation and Rules". In *Synthese* 58, p. 303-323.

Chomsky, N., 2009. *Cartesian Linguistics. A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought*. New York: Cambridge University Press. (1e, 1966. London and New York: Harper & Row).

Chomsky, N., 2000. *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chomsky, N., 1995. *The Minimalist Program*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Mit Press.

Cimatti, F., 2007. *Il volto e la parola. Psicologia dell'apparenza*. Macerata: Quodlibet.

De Carolis, M., 2008. *Il paradosso antropologico. Nicchie, micromondi e dissociazione psichica*. Macerata: Quodlibet.

Deleuze, G., 2007. *Two Regimes of Madness. Texts and Interviews 1975-1995*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Mit Press.

Deleuze, G., 1997. "Bartebly; or, the Formula". In Deleuze, G., 1997. *Essays Critical and Clinical*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 68-90.

Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., 1994. *What Is Philosophy?*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Fabbrichesi Leo, R., 2000. *I corpi del significato. Lingua, scrittura e conoscenza in Leibniz e Wittgenstein*. Milano: Jaca Book.

Fortuna, S., 2002. *A un secondo sguardo. Il mobile confine tra percezione e linguaggio*. Roma: Manifestolibri.

Gargani, A. G., 2008. *Wittgenstein. Musica, parola, gesto*. Milano: Raffaello Cortina.

Gebauer, G., 2009. *Wittgensteins anthropologisches Denken*. München: Verlag C. H. Beck.

Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., Fitch W. T., 2002. "The Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?". In *SCIENCE*, vol. 298, November 2002, p. 1569-1579.

Kenny, A., 2006. *Wittgenstein*. Revised Edition. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing.

Kripke, S., 1982. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

McDowell, J., 1984. "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule". In *Synthese* 58, p. 325-363.

Moyal-Sharrock, D., 2013. "Wittgenstein's Razor: The Cutting Edge of Enactivism". In *American Philosophical Quarterly*. 50, 3, p. 263-279.

Ter Hark, M., 1990. *Beyond the Inner and the Outer: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Virno, P., 2010. "Prefazione". In Garroni, E., 2010. *Creatività*. Macerata: Quodlibet.

Virno, P., 2005. *Motto di spirito e azione innovativa. Per una logica del cambiamento*. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.

Virno, P., 2003. *Quando il verbo si fa carne. Linguaggio e natura umana*. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.

Wittgenstein, L., 2009. *Philosophical Investigations*. The German text, with an English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Revised 4th edition by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Malden, Oxford and Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd (1e, 1953. Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

Wittgenstein, L., 1967. *Zettel*. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright. Translated by G:E.M. Anscombe. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Wright, C., 1981. "Rule-following, Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning". In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich, eds. 1981. *Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 99-117.

NOTES

¹ Reference to the film “The Blob” (1958).

² That oscillation between the will to construct and maintain a symbolic order, on the one hand, and the desire to open up to chaos, to modify and to revolutionize what has been done, on the other, is the topic of the essay by De Carolis 2008.

³ On the relationship between meaning and embodied action in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy see Moyal-Sharrock 2013.

⁴ This article has been developed within a research project (n. 219368) granted by the Research Council of Norway under YGGDRASIL mobility programme 2012-2013.

Copyright © 2013 Minerva

All rights are reserved, but fair and good faith use with full attribution may be made of this work for educational or scholarly purposes.

Emiliano La Licata is guest researcher at The Wittgenstein Archives, Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, Norway.

Email: emiliano.lalicata@gmail.com