

Autonomy of the Other: on Kant, Levinas, and Universality

Simon Skempton

Abstract

Kantian autonomy and Levinasian alterity (otherness) superficially appear to be antithetical conceptions of the basis of moral action. The purpose of this article is to put forward a reconsideration of the relationship between these two notions, one in which alterity is demonstrated to be an integral component of autonomy and normative universalization. Kant's account of autonomy is reconstructed in such a way as to clearly indicate the unity of its descriptive and normative aspects, the fact that an obligation to the other person necessarily follows from the fact of autonomy. Levinas's account of the exposure to alterity is shown to share with Kant a concern with the moral necessity of transcending naturalistic phenomenality. A confirmation of the incompatibility of autonomy with mere self-interest and narcissistic solipsism leads to a discussion of the implications of the inherent sociality of autonomy.

1. Introduction

Moral philosophy has had recourse to the themes of "autonomy" and "the other" at different moments in its history. For example, the basis of morality is regarded by Kant as the autonomous adoption of the moral law free from external and affective influences, whereas it is regarded by Levinas as a responsiveness and openness to the other person. The question here is whether these two concerns contradict or complement each other.

It certainly would appear at first glance that there is a straightforward opposition between Kantian autonomy and Levinasian heteronomy, between the self and the other as sources of moral obligation. The aims here are to dispel this dichotomy by demonstrating how both philosophers base morality on practical reason as disinterested transcendence and to suggest how a consequent understanding of

universality and alterity as mutually dependent could inform a conception of a rational sociality that would further the autonomy of each person.

2. Descriptive and Normative Autonomy

The passing of moral judgement on an act necessarily involves the supposition that the person who committed the act is able to freely choose what to do or what not to do. Even in cases of oversight or negligence, moral culpability or praise can arise only if it can be determined that the person could have done otherwise. The ability to act deliberately and independently of impulses and instincts is what distinguishes a moral being from a mere beast. However, this ability and this distinction are themselves subject to an affirmative moral judgement or normative evaluation. The ability to act freely and independently, “autonomy” in the vernacular sense of the word, is not only a factual description of a person, but is itself valued as something to be encouraged and cultivated. It is certainly valued above the mechanical functioning of a machine or the instinctual behaviour of an animal. It is good to be able to be good. The possibility of moral values is itself morally valuable. Genuinely independent voluntary action, free from social coercion or uncontrollable instincts, is the precondition of moral responsibility and is thus not only the founding *of* moral value but is itself *the* founding moral value.

2.1. Disinterested Duty

In his essay on the concept of “Enlightenment”, Kant uses the term “maturity” to refer to intellectual and practical independence, a condition of freedom from the “immature” state of being guided by others (Kant 2005b: 119). Enlightened maturity means that the subject is free from the influence of anything but its own power of reasoning. It thus involves what Kant calls “autonomy”. However, this autonomy is not merely independence from external compulsion. Kant uses the word in its strict etymological sense to mean the self-giving of the law, the *autos* being the source of its

own *nomos*. In this sense the autonomous subject does not simply act in spontaneous freedom from any given rules; it acts according to a rule it gives itself.

Kantian autonomy involves the person's willing attachment to a rational principle of action. For this attachment to be genuinely autonomous the motivation behind it must be detached from any external influence and the principle of action must be produced by the person's own faculty of reason. According to Kant, the only action that is free from any external influence is done out of duty to the moral law. A law is only moral if it is produced by a person's rational will. Any action not done out of pure duty, such as actions motivated by inclinations or desires, is done under a heteronomous externally derived principle.

Heteronomy of the will comes about when the object of an action, the state of affairs that the action is intended to bring about, determines the agent's motivation. If the motivation behind an action is the wish to bring about the happiness of another person then the action in question cannot be classified as moral. This is because the motivation comes from an inclination, a "wish", and not from pure duty. Duty is inherently bereft of any interest in the object of the action and is thus immune from any sentiment provoked by it. Kant's deontological ethics involves a certain neo-Stoicism as against the neo-Epicureanism of the utilitarians, as for him moral virtue precedes any consideration of happiness or pleasure rather than being founded on the principle of the furthering of the latter.

A heteronomous principle of action stemming from an inclination towards a desired state of affairs Kant calls a "hypothetical imperative". This imperative takes the following form: I should do x if I desire y . The autonomous principle of action stemming from a sense of duty to itself, to the founding principle of moral rationality that it itself is, Kant calls the "categorical imperative". This is formulated most clearly by Kant in the following way: "*Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same*

time will that it become a universal law” (Kant 2005a: 81). This is the principle of principles, the law of the law, the rational basis of practical rationality. The principle that there must be principles is itself a principle, the founding principle of all principles, just as the basis of rationality is itself rational, based as it is on the principle of non-contradiction (what Kant calls “the principle of contradiction” (Kant 1996: 70)). Not contradicting itself is fundamental to and definitive of rationality. Non self-contradiction is rationality, and taken to its logical conclusion this rationality involves the universality of laws and principles. A non self-contradictory principle entails universality as it must necessarily apply in all identical cases. Its failure to apply in any such case would render it self-contradictory and disqualify it from being rational and from being a principle at all. A will that determines itself rationally will thus find itself able to will, without contradicting itself, that the determining principle of its action become a universal law that all rational beings would will.

According to Kant, any non-autonomous motivations, ones deriving from inclinations provoked by the object of the action rather than respect for the moral law, are irrational and “pathological”. To act on a pathological basis is to act out of inclination rather than reason. Pathological acts are unfree as they are ultimately explainable by reference to the heteronomous laws of natural or physical causality (Kant 1996: 61). Acts of practical reason are autonomous and free, because the motivation behind them is independent from the mechanical causality of physical impulses. However, such rational acts are predictable and explainable precisely because they are rational. The being who acts rationally acts in the same way that all other rational beings would act in the same situation. Although rational beings are numerous, there is only one rationality. Each autonomous rational being acts in accordance with a law which she gives herself out of her own faculty of reason, but each rational being’s own reason is the same. This owning of reason refers to the singular attachment of the singular being to the universality of reason. Acting in freedom from the natural causality of the inclinations is practical reason, which itself is autonomy as the self-giving of the

principle of action, which in turn is itself expressed as the categorical imperative whereby any free rational being gives itself the principle of action that all other rational beings would give themselves. Thus the categorical imperative, autonomy, and morality as practical reason are ultimately identical.

2.2. Autonomy and the Power of Choice

Autonomy is then identified with action that is free from mechanical determination. Such freedom is concomitantly nothing other than action done out of duty to the rational moral law. This notion of freedom is one which is equated with *being* rational and morally good, rather than with the *choice* of whether to be good or bad. This appears at one level to run counter to the common understanding of freedom as precisely involving such a choice. However, Kantian autonomous freedom involves choice as a necessary precondition. Kant insists that morality as practical reason is not merely the following of the moral law, is not mere acting in accordance with rational moral rules, but is the self-giving of the rational moral law by the rational will that determines free action (Kant 1996: 102). Thus autonomy, which is identified with both moral goodness and freedom from natural causality, necessarily involves not only the choice to be autonomous but also the ability to choose whether to be autonomous or not. Moral freedom contains both these “necessary suppositions”. Kant writes that “freedom... results... from the necessary supposition of independence on the sensible world, and of the faculty of determining one’s will according to the law of an intelligible world” (Kant 1996: 159). There could be no self-determining of the will according to the moral law without the possibility of choosing otherwise.

Moral freedom as autonomy involves choosing to determine one’s will according to the rationality of the moral law. The power of choice is a necessary but not sufficient condition of such freedom. Mere freedom of choice is not freedom at all in the

Kantian sense. It is not freedom unless the agent, through its own choice, extricates itself from impulses, inclinations and desires, which are all ultimately explainable through the laws of natural causality. This extrication can only be achieved through the self-giving of the moral law, for the sake of this law alone, in other words, out of pure duty to the law rather than any desire for the accomplishment of any state of affairs in the world.

However, there is a problem with the supposition here that the mere power of choice does not itself fulfill the condition of freedom from natural causality. Choice would not be choice at all if it were determined by physical causal laws. Kant accepts this when he writes: “[W]hatever springs from a man’s choice (as every action intentionally performed undoubtedly does) has as its foundation a free causality” (Kant 1996: 122). This “free causality” of the agent is its “causality as a *noumenon*” (Kant 1996: 120), one which transcends the phenomenal world of natural causality. Mechanistic cause and effect relations characterize the realm of phenomena, of what appears to the observing consciousness. Hence any free subject, any agent that can make a choice, *qua* free subject, cannot be a phenomenon, it cannot appear as an object. If a human is observed objectively she cannot be understood as a free being. A free subject must then be a non-phenomenal thing-in-itself, a noumenon that is not empirically knowable and which is intelligible negatively as an entity that transcends phenomenal determination.

Kant appears to be contradicting himself when he argues that the autonomous self-giving of the moral law is the only way of transcending natural causality while also arguing that the mere power of choice itself involves the same transcendence. Henry Sidgwick puts forward this view (Sidgwick 1907: 511-516). However, it is only a contradiction if autonomy and the power of choice are both considered to be sufficient conditions of the same kind of freedom. Kant holds, as we have seen, that the power of choice is a necessary but not sufficient condition of autonomy and also that

autonomy is the only way in which the motivation behind human action can be fully free from the inclinations provided by natural causality. While the power of choice itself is not determined by natural causality, the choice faced by the agent is one between acting independently of the inclinations or acting according to them, between moral action or non-moral action. One can freely choose to acquiesce to the unfree causality of one's inclinations. What makes the agent responsible or culpable is her ability to choose between the autonomy of the self-legislated but universal moral law or succumbing to the heteronomy of the inclinations. Only a person who is capable of freedom as rational autonomy can be held accountable for surrendering to the unfreedom of the forces of natural causality.

2.3. Autonomy as Unconditional Value

According to Kant, only such a being, a rational being capable of moral autonomy, can be the ultimate object of moral obligation. Rationality as autonomy is not only a descriptive characteristic of a person, but is also what gives a person value. A rational being is an end-in-itself and not a mere means to a further end. That which is a means to an end possesses the relative value that Kant calls "price", whereas that which is an end-in-itself possesses intrinsic value, an infinite and unquantifiable value that Kant calls "dignity" (Kant 2005a: 93). As it is the rational being that gives the moral law to itself, and as it is the moral law that assigns value, then the rational being as the ground of value possesses the ultimate value. Kant writes: "[T]he legislation itself which assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess dignity, that is, an unconditioned incomparable worth... *Autonomy* then is the basis of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature" (Kant 2005a: 94). The autonomy of the rational being is the ultimate value as it is the source of value as such.

Autonomy is both descriptive and normative, because within the very features of its description lies the ground of normativity. Moral standards and values come about

through the autonomous self-giving of a moral law which is rational because universalizable, applicable to all rational beings. But why is the ground of normativity itself normative? Why is having values itself a value? It is because morality is practical reason as the universalizability of the will in the categorical imperative, a universalizability that must contain its own basis within itself in order to be consistent and universal. This means that the categorical imperative itself falls under the categorical imperative. The maxim, “act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”, is itself a maxim that the rational being can will to be a universal law. For universality to be universal and therefore consistent, it must be consistent with its foundation. Reason is universality, as universality is the ultimate consistency. As we have seen, reason is founded on the principle of non-contradiction, which is the principle of consistency. According to the principle of universal consistency, or consistent universality, morality as the expression of rational universality must be founded on itself. Thus the foundation of morality is itself moral. That there be morality is itself a moral imperative.

Morality as practical reason is grounded on itself. The decision to be moral is itself moral; it is not pre-moral. Kant writes:

[A]utonomy, that is to say, the capacity of the maxims of every good will to make themselves a universal law, is itself the only law which the will of every rational being imposes on itself, without needing to assume any incentive or interest as its ground (Kant 2005a: 102).

It is the categorical imperative as the “*mere form of the law*” (Kant 1996: 46), the law of the law or the law that there be law, that is the ground of morality or the moral law, nothing extra-moral or extra-legal. This contrasts with the view of Derrida for whom any system of law is founded on an extra-legal moment of force (Derrida 2002: 230-298). Thus for Derrida rationality and morality are not founded on themselves, but on

what they exclude, on the non-rational and non-moral. However, this argument does not distinguish between force that founds legality and force that does not. As we have seen, the injunction that there be law, that there be reason, is consistent with the internal coherence of legality and rationality, with consistency and coherence as such. Thus such an injunction is not to be identified, whatever the empirical conditions, with a mere non-legal and non-rational moment of force. The law that there be law is not only the foundation of the law, but also a law itself, the principal one, the law of the law.

2.4. Practical Reason versus Instrumentality

The self-founding consistency of autonomy as pure practical reason is the source of both its positive and normative aspects. This puts it at odds with utilitarian or instrumental notions of reason. The latter follow Hume's dictum that "reason is... the slave of the passions" (Hume 1978: 415). Hume argues that the faculty of reason can only be used to work out the best means of achieving a certain aim, but it can have no influence on that aim itself. It thus has no normative dimension. Values are ultimately the product of contingent desires or sentiments that have over time become customary. The terms "morality" and "ethics" derive from Latin and Greek words for what is customary. If "morality" has come to mean what is right or wrong irrespective of custom or sentiment, it concurs with Kant's notion of practical reason as autonomy, the rational self-giving of the law. However, for Hume and other advocates of a purely instrumental understanding of reason, the aims and purposes that the workings of reason can help to realize have no rational basis.

In contrast to instrumental reason, reason as a mere means to a non-rational end, Kantian pure practical reason does not only set the means but also the ends. As reason is the principle of universalizable consistency, reason that is restricted to being a means is not really rational at all. Such a restriction cuts short its universalizable

consistency, its very rationality itself. Instrumental reason involves a restriction of reason, a restriction of that which by its nature is unrestricted and universal.

The restricted “rationality” of instrumental reason is how rationality is generally understood in modern capitalist society and in the science of economics. Adorno and Horkheimer attribute such reason to the Enlightenment and its legacy, though they call it “formalistic” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979: 95) rather than “instrumental” reason. Whatever they call it, it is still a form of reason that is restricted to the instrumental calculation of mere means, reason that is in itself indifferent to the aims it is used for. They write: “Reason is the organ of calculation, of planning; it is neutral in regard to ends” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979: 88). What is curious about their argument is that, throughout the chapter on the Enlightenment and morality in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, they include Kantian reason within their description of a reason that is restricted to dealing with means and not ends, making it indistinguishable from utilitarian reason. They write: “Since it exposes substantial goals as the power of nature over mind, as the erosion of its self-legislation, reason is – by virtue, too, of its very formality – at the service of any natural interest” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979: 87). However, for Kant, it is the very formality of reason, its freedom from heteronomous natural influences, which enables it to posit goals which are themselves rational and disinterested, not mere symptoms of unfree pathological urges and inclinations. It is only instrumental reason that can be “a slave of the passions” or “at the service of any natural interest”. In confusing formality with instrumentality, Adorno and Horkheimer erroneously conflate Kantian and utilitarian reason.

As Kantian pure practical reason sets not only the means but also the ends of an action, the question of what such ends are arises. The only goal that reason sets is reason itself. For reason to be rational, for reason to be universally consistent, it must not be irrationally restricted through being employed to further a non-rational aim;

thus it must further a rational aim, the only rational aim, which is the exercise of reason itself. As reason is only exercised in the actions of a rational being, the rational being is the aim of all rational action. As reason involves universality, each and every rational being is an aim set by reason. As reason cannot coherently be a means to a non-rational end, all truly rational action must involve a rational being treating any other rational being as an end-in-itself and not a mere means. As we have seen, rational beings have intrinsic absolute value as ends-in-themselves, because the exercise of reason is the ground of all value. According to the principle of universal consistency, of non-contradiction, which is the principle of reason itself, it is rational that there be reason, it is valuable that there be value. Thus autonomy *qua* practical reason *qua* morality entails that every autonomous rational moral being treats every other such being as an end-in-itself and not as a means. This itself entails what Kant calls a “kingdom of ends”, a society wherein each member is treated as an end-in-itself and is never utilized as a means to a further end. This is a society where the principle of instrumentality, what capitalist economists call “rationality”, cannot apply to relations between people. Whatever such economists wish to call the restricted pseudo-rationality of instrumentality, the notion of a truly rational society as a “kingdom of ends” is spun out of what for Kant is the principle of reason itself, the principle of non-contradiction, of consistent universality.

2.5. Transcending the Given

It is important to note that the Kantian practical reason in question here is not to be understood as the implementation of a pre-given rational order. This is why it is identified with autonomy, the self-giving of the law. However, it may be argued that as all rational beings give themselves the same law, this law must be pre-given. In that case a pre-given reason would be realized in the actions of rational beings. If reason is pre-given, how can it be self-given, how can there be autonomy?

Practical reason is not pre-given, because the autonomous rational being each time freely legislates for the principle of its own action, freely choosing to avoid the givenness of natural necessity. As we have seen, Kant claims that there is a radical distinction between acting out of duty to the moral law and merely acting in accordance with it. For those who view the person as an object, such as behaviourists and their ilk, this is a false distinction, because the behaviour exhibited in both forms of action appears to be identical. Nevertheless, there is a difference between a person who freely chooses to act such that she can will the action to be universally applicable and a person whose actions merely coincide with pre-established moral rules. What is more, there is a difference between an autonomous rational agent and an automaton who acts according to pre-programmed rules, even if their actions are the same. The difference between autonomy and automatism is that the former involves the rational will. An automaton, whose actions are pre-determined, cannot will its maxim of action to be a universal law. Nor can a person whose will is pathologically determined by natural urges in the guise of an interest in or a desire for the accomplishment of the state of affairs that would result from her action. The free rational will involved in the categorical imperative must be characterized by the Stoically dispassionate *apatheia* of pure duty, free from the influence of inclinations, for it to fulfill the requirements of autonomy. Moral action, the autonomous performance of practical reason, is thus entirely dispassionate, and therefore cannot be the action of someone under the influence of urges that can ultimately be explained by the laws of natural causality. This is because to be moral it must be free, free from any pre-given rules, whether those of natural necessity or those which are pre-programmed into an automaton.

The moral rational being gives itself the law; the law does not come from anywhere else. The law it gives itself is purely formal; it has no pre-given content. The law the autonomous moral rational being gives itself is the law of the law, the law that there be law, the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is the principle of non-contradiction in the form of an imperative. The rational will rationally wills that there

be rationality. The categorical imperative is the subjective form of the principle of reason, of non-contradiction, in that here reason addresses a free subject who can choose to follow it or not. An imperative cannot be addressed to an automaton or a merely natural being.

Only action arising from autonomy can be described as moral. Even if a case of automatic or pathological action is effectively identical to a case of action arising from autonomy, only the latter can count as being morally good. Any desirable consequences of merely natural events could hardly be described as the results of genuinely moral action. For action to be moral it must arise out of the free responsibility of a rational and autonomous will. This contrasts with any utilitarian consequentialist moral philosophy that attributes the moral value of an action to its consequences alone. Such consequentialism is a suitable moral philosophy for any naturalistic reductionism that is unable to distinguish between a non-conscious “philosophical zombie” and a conscious being when they both exhibit the same behaviour (Dennett 1993: 406). However, if morality by definition involves responsibility and the power of choice then it can only apply to a conscious being capable of autonomous reasoning.

As morality depends on such autonomy, indeed as morality and autonomy are identical, autonomy is the founding moral value, which is simply to say that morality is moral. Thus the descriptive fact of autonomy is the ground of its normative value. All the moral values that are spun out of the nature of morality boil down to the categorical imperative, the principle of principles, the principle that there be morality, the autonomously self-given law that there be autonomy, autonomy as its own universalization, the autonomy of each other. Autonomy then is both fact and value. Hume argues against the derivation of an “ought from an is” (Hume 1978: 469), a derivation of value from fact that G. E. Moore later terms the “naturalistic fallacy” (Moore 1993: 61-71). Kantian autonomy may involve spinning an “ought” out of its

own “is”, but it does not involve a “naturalistic fallacy”. This is because the “is” in question is not an empirical or natural fact. It is something purely formal, the form of the law. The existence of the moral law as the principle of universal consistency in the form of a categorical imperative addressed to a rational will is described by Kant as “not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of the pure reason, which thereby announces itself as originally legislative” (Kant 1996: 47). The autonomy that this involves is the only way a person can transcend natural facts and influences. In fact, the fact of autonomy is the fact of the transcendence of facts, which is itself the founding value that makes value possible.

3. Heteronomy of the Other

Thus, for Kant, autonomy as the transcendence of the naturalistic given is the basis of morality. Such transcendence contrasts with the immanence involved in moral philosophies that are either based on the eudaimonistic flourishing of a pre-given human nature or the norms arising out of the traditional life of a community. An emphasis on the transcendent nature of morality can also be found in the works of Levinas. Here transcendence takes the form of a breach in the closed totality of a phenomenal givenness by the “infinity” of an unassimilable absolute otherness. Yet, as we suggested at the beginning, morality founded on an openness to the other appears to be infected with heteronomy. At first glance, it seems that Levinasian transcendence as heteronomy is diametrically opposed to Kantian transcendence as autonomy.

Indeed, for Levinas, the self is only brought out of its narcissistic enclosure into a state of moral responsibility through encountering the other. The call to responsibility comes through the face of the other person. The source of any moral injunction is external to the self. Morality is thus heteronomous. Levinas himself uses the term “heteronomy” in this regard (Levinas 2006: 149). For both Kant and Levinas,

responsible moral action involves transcending the given phenomenal order. However, for Levinas, such transcendence does not involve a free self giving itself the moral law. It involves the moral law taking the form of a heteronomous imperative issuing from the noumenal other.

3.1. Disinterest and the Other

Despite the ostensible gulf between heteronomous and autonomous conceptions of morality, Levinas proclaims a profound affinity with Kantian ethics (Levinas 2006: 9). There is more to this than a shared concern with transcendence rather than immanence. For both Kant and Levinas, the transcendence of the empirical and natural given makes possible the dispassionate and disinterested rationality required by genuine morality. This may seem to be a surprising description of Levinas's position, as he asserts the ethical necessity of respect for the singularity of the other as against any generalizing logical and rational formalism.

However, the "feeling" of respect does not compromise dispassionate disinterestedness. Both the notions of respect and disinterestedness are as important for Kant as they are for Levinas. As we have seen, Kant regards respect for the moral law as being the only type of motivation that transcends the heteronomy of the inclinations. But it remains a motivation and therefore an "interest", of a sort. It is an exceptional non-sensuous "disinterested interest" that Kant calls a "moral interest" (Kant 1996: 101-102).

Similarly, for Levinas, morality and "goodness", in the form of responsibility for the other, are inherently disinterested (Levinas 2006: 135). Such disinterestedness does not only mean that the other comes before the self, but also that the other comes before any of the self's inclinations or dispositions, including any sentiments of sympathy or generosity. Levinas claims that responsibility to the other involves a

response to an imperative that is “not the recall of some prior generous dispositions toward the other” (Levinas 2006: 149). Sympathy and generosity do not transcend the narcissism of the self or open it to the otherness of the other. Such feelings cannot be described as ethical, as the ethical must by definition go beyond what is merely sentimental. The object of moral action cannot be confined to that which provokes a sentimental reaction in the self. Both Kant and Levinas insist on disinterest as a precondition of ethical transcendence. Sentiments and inclinations are regarded by Kant as reducible to natural causality and by Levinas as expressions of auto-affective narcissism. They are therefore regarded by both moral philosophies as a menace to genuine morality. Moral obligations are to every person, every other, not just to those for whom the self feels affection. The Levinasian imperative from the other is, in its transcendent dispassionate disinterestedness, in its freedom from naturally given inclinations, not at all a case of what Kant calls “heteronomy”.

3.2. Reason as the Opening to the Other

The supposed heteronomy of the other is precisely what brings the self out of its egoistic irrational interestedness. This is only “heteronomy” in the sense in which Levinas occasionally uses the term. For Kant, genuine disinterestedness can only be autonomous. However, there is really no difference between Kantian transcendent autonomy and Levinasian transcendent heteronomy. They both involve a disinterested rationality of a sort. An egoism bereft of the influence of the other constitutes an irrational auto-anomie. Levinas writes:

Contingency, that is, the irrational, appears to it not outside of itself in the other, but within itself. It is not limitation by the other that constitutes contingency, but egoism... The relation with the Other as a relation with his transcendence... puts an end to violence and contingency, and, in this sense also, founds Reason (Levinas 1969: 203-204).

Thus reason comes from the other. It could be said that reason is the principle of the other, the principle that as internal immanence is ultimately irrational in its restricted finitude the universality of principles depends on the transcendence of internality. The breach of the internality of totality in the encounter with the other does not only bring about a sense of responsibility to the singular other. Levinas claims that this breach is also an opening onto humanity in general and that “the third party looks at me through the eyes of the Other” (Levinas 1969: 213). An obligation to the other carries with it an obligation to each and every other, whereas an “obligation” to the self is restricted and non-universalized. Levinas defines rationality in the following way: “Reason is the one-for-the-other” (Levinas 1998: 167). This is not the one-for-itself of auto-nomie or the one-for-whichever-other-it-feels-sympathy-for of heteronomy, but the one-for-each-and-every-other of autonomy, the individual *autos* for the universality of *nomos*.

The reason in question is pure practical reason, occurring only as moral action and not as an ideal order apprehended by a merely theoretical consciousness. Theoretical reason, what Kant calls “pure speculative reason”, involves what is, for Levinas, “the internal coherence of an ideal order” bereft of alterity and singularity (Levinas 1969: 208). Both Kant and Levinas hold the position that the “internality” of theoretical reason prevents it from being genuinely rational. For Levinas, as can be seen in the quote above about egoistic contingency, the very internality of theoretical reason, closed off from the universality of the other, makes it a restricted irrational rationality. As for Kant, one of the principal themes of his *Critique of Pure Reason* is how pure theoretical reason leads to irrational self-contradictions. Both empiricist instrumental reason and rationalist pure reason involve irrational restrictions of reason, because they lack the transcendent universality required to conform to the principle of universalizable consistency. Reason is only genuinely and consistently rational when it is pure practical reason. Rational reason, as opposed to restricted irrational reason, is nothing other than moral action. This is asserted by both Kant and Levinas. For

Kant, the only genuinely pure reason, the only reason that goes beyond the phenomenal givenness of experience, is reason as an autonomously free act (Kant 1996: 13-14). For Levinas, the internality of theoretical reason can be overcome by reason as free action responsible to the other (Levinas 1969: 208).

3.3. Practical Reason and the Singular Being

Practical reason means that the universality of reason only occurs in the singularity of each moral act. Levinas and Kant concur in this, but Levinas, at one point, expresses doubt as to whether his own position is compatible with Kant's conception of reason, because the very notion of the rationality of people suggests an abolition of their otherness to each other, of their distinctiveness. Levinas writes: "Reason has no plural; how could numerous reasons be distinguished? How could the Kantian kingdom of ends be possible...?" (Levinas 1969: 119). Of course, Kant does not call people "reasons"; he calls them "rational beings". As we have seen, reason is one but rational beings are indeed plural. Practical reason is the intersection between the universality of reason and the singularity of being. It is only in this practical intersection that reason is genuinely rational, as theoretical reason leads to irrational antinomies. The rationality of a rational being is an attribute and thus a universal. The being of a rational being is not an attribute; it is the very each-ness of each irreducibly unique being. The proposition that being is not an attribute, or that existence is not a predicate, is the basis of Kant's refutation of the ontological proof of God's existence (Kant 1993: 407-412). The point here is that the rationality of rational beings does not prevent such beings from being distinguishable. The universality of reason only occurs in the distinct act of a distinct being. This is the meaning of the dictum that the only genuinely rational reason, the only "pure" reason, is pure practical reason.

Catherine Chalié argues that in Kantian ethics it is the similarity of the other to the self, the fact that they share the characteristic of rational autonomy, that is the basis of

the self's respect for the other, a respect that is then ultimately nothing more than an extension of egoism. She then draws a sharp contrast between the supposedly Kantian respect for the similarity of the other and the supposedly Levinasian respect for the other's distinctiveness. She writes:

The subject... respects not the other's singular and irreplaceable personality but rather that which makes him or her similar to itself: the other's humanity, that is, according to Kant, his or her capacity to be the author of moral law (Chalier 2002: 65). ... [I]t is not the alterity of the other that it respects, but what he or she has in common with the subject, namely, reason (Chalier 2002: 68).

The problem with this demarcation of the Kantian and Levinasian positions is that it implies that reason is separable from the Levinasian infinite alterity of an irreplaceable personhood. This singular alterity is a feature of an experiencing and expressive living "conscious" being, whose "face" in its vulnerability calls the self out of itself, out of its reasonless solipsism, into the ethical relation, the ethical act, which, as we have seen, Levinas equates with pure practical reason. While Kant's formalistic grounding of ethics is very different in its approach from Levinas's understanding of the basis of the ethical as the phenomenological encounter with the other, a certain contentless formalism is essential to both philosophies. Singular alterity is a feature of personhood that is beyond any identifiable contents, any qualitative determinations, contents which are just phenomenal objectifications of the other, instantiations of universals or specific cases of genera and which thus have nothing to do with singularity. In this way, the "concept" of singular alterity is as emptily formal as that of the autonomous being who is an end-in-itself enacting the mere form of the law. Kantian and Levinasian moral disinterest in the objectifiable phenomenal contents of the character of the other both make possible respect for the other's transcendent singularity.

As the exercise of reason is the ground of all value, and as the exercise of reason only occurs in the practical acts of a rational being, each rational being is, each time, the bearer of the dignity of absolute value, and is thus an irreducible end-in-itself. The each-ness of each rational act and each rational being indicates that practical reason (which is, as we have seen, the only rational reason, the only reason that does not ultimately contradict itself) is the confluence of the singular and the universal. This practical each-ness that practical reason involves indicates that the practically rational kingdom of ends would not, as Levinas fears, subsume individuals under an overarching reason that would abolish their distinctiveness.

3.4. Heterology of Ends

Thus a genuinely rational society would not be an expressive totality in which each member is an embodiment of an underlying organizing principle. It would be a heterology of irreducible ends, in which the infinity and absolute worth of each rational being is maintained, each time, in practical interpersonal relations. The infinity of each means that no person can be reduced to being an expression of an underlying or overarching principle, of an organically unifying *logos*. The infinity of the other constitutes what Levinas terms a breach of totality; it is transcendence. In the immanence of an organically expressive totality the person would not be an end-in-itself, but a means towards the actualization of a supra-personal principle. This could even be the principle of a pseudo-reason. This would be a pseudo-reason, because, as we have seen, genuine reason, in its radical universality, cannot amount to the internal coherence of an exclusionary and restricted totality. Genuine reason is not internal coherence; it is transcendence. Reason itself is the opening to the other. Levinas writes:

In the welcoming of the face the will opens to reason. ... The passage to the rational is not a dis-individuation precisely because it is language, that is, a response to the being who in a face speaks to the subject and tolerates only a personal response, that is, an ethical act (Levinas 1969: 219).

Thus practical reason is interpersonal communicative action that transcends all internality. It is only transcendent in that it each time, in each rational act, treats the other in its infinite dignity, as an end-in-itself. The internality of a totality can only be a system of means and not a heterology of ends. Such a totality is an economy where the only value is the relative value of price. Pure practical reason is the opposite of calculative economic instrumental pseudo-reason. In its perpetual transcendence it is each time an opening to the absolute value of dignity.

This heterology of ends is not to be confused with heteronomy, whatever the lexical resemblance, as it involves the autonomy of each. Practical reason is autonomous action towards the autonomy of the other.

Levinas's philosophy of alterity is not only compatible with Kant's philosophy of practical reason; it complements it in the form of a phenomenological elaboration. While the phenomenological mode of presentation differs sharply from Kant's formalism, the principle of responsibility to the other expressed by Levinas can be derived from the categorical imperative. Both Levinas and Kant agree that transcendence is the basis of genuine rationality. The principle of universalizability involves the necessity of transcendence.

Levinas's philosophy is, in this way, rational. This belies Derrida's depiction of it as an "empiricism" that involves "the *dream* of a purely *heterological* thought" (Derrida 2001: 189). The normative heterology of either a kingdom of ends or an unassimilable alterity is derived from the principle of reason itself, the principle of transcendent universalizability, and not from a thought that is itself heterological. As we have seen, the principle of universalizability is an elaboration of a principle of the utmost simplicity, the principle of non-contradiction.

Autonomy arises from the encounter with the other. It is only in this encounter that the self transcends itself and adopts the moral law, that the *autos* is awoken to the *nomos*. That the law arises through encountering the other is not a case of heteronomy in the Kantian sense. On the contrary, it is the basis of the transcendence of the heteronomy of natural causality.

4. Heteronomy of the Self

Thus the emphasis on autonomy is not an assertion of any kind of solipsistic egoism. The latter would be auto-anomie. However, with autonomy it is still the self that gives itself the law. This depends on a notion of the self as containing an element of indeterminate spontaneity that is a necessary condition of its ability to transcend natural causality. This element of indeterminate spontaneity is necessarily lawless and anomalous. This very anomie of spontaneity is a precondition for both the transcendence of the naturalistic heteronomy of nomological causality and the realization of the moral autonomy of nomological rationality. This spontaneity of the autonomous subject is put into question by theories which regard it as an effect of an impersonal functionality.

Such theories proclaim the supposedly free self to be in reality a mere function of heteronomous social or natural processes. Many Marxists regard the independent and isolated autonomous subject as merely the form of subjectivity required by and produced by the capitalist mode of production. The latter requires independent workers free to sell their labour to whomever. It also apparently requires thrifty and ascetic capitalists keen to save and invest rather than squander their profits. This view, which owes more to Weber than it does to Marx, is expressed by Adorno and Horkheimer when they suggest that the ascetic neo-Stoicism of Kantian autonomy constitutes the epitome of bourgeois ideology (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979: 96).

The free independent autonomous self would thus be an illusory ideological effect with the heteronomous function of maintaining the social status quo.

The notion of the heteronomous functionality of a pseudo-autonomous self is also a feature of “post-structuralist” accounts of subjectivity. Here the autonomous subject is regarded as an effect of impersonal linguistic and discursive structures. For example, Derrida claims that self-identity and consciousness are mere functions of a system of differential relations (Derrida 1982: 15). He also argues that a free decision to act can never be made by a self-identical subject (Derrida 2002: 253). The undetermined spontaneity of decision can only occur as a rupture in the self-identity of the functional subject, “as if it came to him from the other” (Derrida 2002: 255). Foucault similarly claims that the autonomous subject is a “pseudo-sovereign” (Foucault 1977b: 222) that is a function of a system of “discourse” and power relations. Such a subject cannot be emancipated as it is itself merely a product of a system of profound “subjection” (Foucault 1977a: 30).

This functional understanding of the self is characteristic of naturalistic explanations of consciousness. Dennett claims that the self is a product of natural evolutionary processes and needs. This self amounts to “a web of words and deeds” that the brain spins out unknowingly in order to survive. This process involves the collecting together of a myriad of already existing cultural “found objects”, a kind of mimetically appropriative generation of the self (Dennett 1993: 416). Dennett himself obliquely links his account of the formation of the self with the post-structuralist notion of the subject as an effect of a “web of discourses” (Dennett 1993: 411).

According to Dennett, the self as a function of heteronomous processes rather than the autonomous source of free action does not necessarily lead to the loss of any coherent conception of moral responsibility. He writes:

The task of constructing a self that can *take* responsibility is a major social and educational project, and you are right to be concerned about threats to its integrity. But a brain-pearl, a real, “intrinsically responsible” whatever-it-is, is a pathetic bauble to brandish like a lucky charm in the face of this threat. The only hope... is to come to understand, naturalistically, the ways in which brains grow self-representations, thereby equipping the bodies they control with responsible selves when all goes well (Dennett 1993: 430).

The Kantian noumenal subject of moral action would appear (if it could appear) to be such a “bauble”. However, it by definition cannot appear. This unknowable noumenon is not just a case of Kantian epistemological modesty. Determinate features can be negatively attributed to it. It is not and cannot be a phenomenal object. It is nothing pearl-like or bauble-like. For Kant, its freedom and responsibility depend on its transcendence of natural mechanical causality, on it being radically unlike an observable object that can appear. If the “responsible selves” that Dennett hopes for can be accounted for naturalistically (i.e. heteronomously) then they may at best *conform* to moral principles, by some happy coincidence of the latter with evolutionary needs, but they would not be *responsible* in the radical sense of freely choosing to give themselves the law.

Thus free moral responsibility cannot be an attribute of a self that is conceived in merely functional terms. The notion of genuine autonomy would have to either be abandoned or involve some kind of resistance to the heteronomous self. The abandonment of autonomy would involve the abandonment of the possibility of transcending mechanical causality. The spontaneity of the power of choice, which depends on such transcendence, goes hand-in-hand with the possibility of autonomy. It may be a necessary but not sufficient condition of autonomy, but where there is spontaneity autonomy is always an option. To argue that there is no power of choice, and concomitantly that autonomy is impossible, is to be embroiled in the irrationality of a performative contradiction. To argue that one had no choice but to argue that one

had no choice is effectively to *argue* that one is incapable of arguing. The free will of the power of choice is assumed in any rational argument or conscious deliberation. It thus cannot be rationally argued against.

Functional accounts of the pseudo-autonomous self that wish to maintain the possibility of free action need to advocate an alternative genuinely autonomous self. Foucault regards the pseudo-autonomous “humanist” self as a subject subjected to the functionality of power relations, but he advocates, in his response to Kant’s essay on the meaning of “Enlightenment”, a critical stance and an “autonomous” activity of constant “self-creation” in resistance to the heteronomous givenness of functionality (Foucault 2007: 112). No account is given, however, of the possibility of such a stance or of how such activity would transcend the heteronomy of natural inclinations. In contrast, Marx’s critique of the pseudo-autonomy of the isolated individual of bourgeois ideology is supported by an alternative conception of an authentic self whose transcendent rationality and freedom are based on its sociality.

5. The Sociality of Autonomy

It is in Marx’s notion of generic-being [*Gattungswesen*] that the intrinsic links between freedom, universality and sociality are most clearly expressed. A human is a generic-being in that she is able to abstract herself from her immediate particularity and apprehend things in the element of universality. This is a description of consciousness as the ability to go beyond mere reactions to immediacy and to think in terms of genera, that is, conceptually.

However, this transcendence of natural immediacy is not, for Marx, a merely intellectual or cognitive exercise. As with Levinas’s suggestion that the ability to think rationally, and thus universally and consistently, depends on exposure to the other, Marx claims that the universality of consciousness is a product of the inherent

sociality of humans. The rational universality of consciousness is the “theoretical shape” of living sociality (Marx 1977: 92-93).

The generality of living social consciousness makes it possible for a person to transcend the restricted immediacy of the particularity of utilitarian need and thus to appreciate things for their own sake (Marx 1977: 68). This in turn makes possible not only autonomous creativity and self-determination, but also the ethical relation, one that is freed from the heteronomy of need. Autonomy is then not the auto-anomie of egoistic need, the latter stemming as it does from heteronomous naturalistic laws governing the inclinations. Autonomy is an intrinsically social category.

As with Marxian generic-being, Hegel’s concept of “spirit” refers to a concrete universality based on sociality; in this case, the sociality of mutual recognition. This is not the abstract universality of allegiance to an external principle. It is the “universal self-consciousness” brought about through the mutual acknowledgement of free individuals, the self-knowing of each self in the other (Hegel 1971: 176-177). Seeing oneself as the other, as the other of the other one identifies with, one ascends to the living concrete universality of social (“spiritual” in Hegelian terms) mutuality. Universal self-consciousness is not an overarching identity external to the identifiers; it is each individual living in the element of conscious universality. Mutual acknowledgement constitutes this universal self-consciousness of each person, rendering them free from the constraints of isolated sensuous immediacy, enabling their rationality and autonomy.

The sociality of autonomy in the philosophies of Hegel and Marx seems to contrast with the formalism of Kant’s conception. However, the emphasis is still on universality as the basis of autonomous action. Hegel may criticize Kant’s categorical imperative for being too empty in its formal abstraction to provide a sufficient ground for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable courses of action (Hegel

1995: 460-461), but he still insists that the only genuinely free social actions are ones that are rationally justifiable (Hegel 1991: 159). Hegel's moral rationalism is a fleshing out of the Kantian skeleton, and is in this way contiguous with it.

The Hegelian and post-Hegelian conception of the human as a conscious universal being involves what Feuerbach calls a "twofold life"; a life of both sensuous particularity and conscious universality (Feuerbach 1855: 20). A human, unlike an animal, does not directly merge with its immediate particularity in that it distinguishes itself from its mere individuality through its universal self-consciousness. The ability to self-identify oneself and to deliberately govern oneself depends on this self-division.

Such a duality formally resembles Harry Frankfurt's understanding of free will as involving an identification at the "second-order" reflective level with desires at the "first-order" pre-reflective level (Frankfurt 1998: 12). The "second-order" meta-desire to realize desirable "first-order" desires and resist undesirable ones here involves appropriating desires as authentically one's own through a conscious and reflective approval. A person is heteronomous when simply acting on pre-reflective desires, but autonomous when those desires which are acted on are filtered through a process of reflective acceptance.

The Frankfurtian and Feuerbachian dualities differ in that the former bears no reference to consciousness as lived universality. Frankfurtian meta-desires that approve certain primary desires are not governed by principles and values; they simply reflect what natural selection has happened to determine humans to care about (Frankfurt 2002: 275-276). Such naturalistic contingency deprives the meta-desires of any rational justification and submits them to a heteronomy indistinguishable from that of the primary desires. If the second order is characterized by conscious reflection it must involve conceptual universality as opposed the sensuous particularity of the

first order. Without a reference to social universality it is difficult to see how there could be the self-consciousness and rational deliberation required for the exercise of an autonomous free will.

The “twofold life” that Feuerbach refers to is one in which a limited and mortal biological being is the bearer of an essentially unrestricted universal mental existence. For Feuerbach, the finite sensuous individual is alienated from her own generic-being when the latter is misrecognized as belonging to a projected external theological entity. For Marx, under capitalist socio-economic conditions universality is realized at the abstract societal level – in the form of money, exchange value, and the division of labour – but it is alienated from the individual (Marx 1977: 114). When confined to particularity through the division of labour, a person’s life activity is reduced to being a mere utilitarian means to an end, activity for the sake of subsistence and not for its own sake (Marx 1977: 68). Free productive activity, activity that is done as an end-in-itself and is not restricted to being a means to the fulfillment of needs, can only be performed by a generic-being. It is itself universal activity; freed from the finitude and relativity of physical need it is life itself as intrinsic and absolute value, as an end-in-itself. A person as an unalienated generic-being is able to relate to other people in a non-utilitarian manner. For both Marx and Kant, autonomous universality as the transcendence of merely natural causality is the basis of a rational society of human rather than utilitarian relations.

As autonomy is the transcendence not only of natural but also of socio-historical givenness, a society based on its valorization would be affirmatively non-traditional. Such a society could not have as its organizing principle anything stemming from natural or traditional sentiment or prejudice. Nor could it be based on the maximization of utilitarian aims, which would ultimately be naturalistically determined. As the source of normative value is nothing natural but is the absolute value of the practical reason manifest in each rational being, a rationally moral society

would be one which is organized in such a way as to ensure that utility, custom and sentiment are never given priority over the freedom that is the lived rationality of the autonomous person. This “organization” would have to be nothing other than the interactive praxis of the rational beings themselves and not something imposed from above; otherwise it would not be autonomy that is enabled but the pseudo-autonomy of an immature heteronomous tutelage. A consistent sociality, one that is not alienated from its inherent rationality, would not content itself with the merely negative freedom of abolishing certain constraints on the power of choice. The power of choice can always succumb to the unfreedom of the given, in an act of willful heteronomy. A society based on the substantive freedom of human autonomy would actively discourage that which inhibits that very autonomy. Such inhibitions of autonomy include the valuing of custom for custom’s sake, the acceptance of natural determinations simply because they are natural, and the acceptance of economic conditions that force people to regard their life activity and mutual relations in purely material utilitarian terms.

6. Conclusion

In Kantian terms, the fact of autonomy entails concern for the furthering of the autonomy of the other. It is a mistake to argue that the Levinasian phenomenological ethics of respect for the singularity of the other is antithetical to Kantian formalistic universalism. It is misleading to see Kant as emphasizing what people have in common and Levinas as emphasizing what distinguishes them, as Levinasian singularity and Kantian formality are both attempts at conceiving of personhood as transcending qualitative determinations, as beyond any of the given contents of phenomenal object-hood. It is such transcendence that makes possible the intrinsic absolute worth of each person, beyond any economy of interest. For this reason, Kant and Levinas share an attachment to unconditional disinterestedness and a concomitant opposition to utilitarian and naturalistic approaches to meta-ethics. The Kantian emphasis on rational deliberation and the Levinasian emphasis on a pre-cognitive

encounter with the other person are not, despite appearances to the contrary, mutually exclusive. In fact, Levinas argues that it is this openness to the other that makes the universality of reason possible. In this sense, Kantian formalism is what Marx calls the “theoretical shape” of intersubjective social relations.

Sociality as the generic-being of lived conscious universality, when realized and rendered consistent, is both the basis of and is supported by the principled activity of moral autonomy. Not only do the notions of autonomy and alterity not exclude one another, they are both expressions of the transcendent rationality at the heart of this moral activity. Autonomy as the self-adoption of principled universality entails the furtherance of itself in others; genuinely autonomous action aims at establishing and maintaining the autonomy of the other. Thus the Kantian and Levinasian moral philosophies do not exclude one another, because they both involve notions of practical reason based on a disinterested transcendence of the egoism of the inclinations. The idea of the supposed freedom of the reified ego is undermined by functionalist accounts, but the self as autonomous is the transcendence of all functionality through the free adoption of universal principles of action, of the moral law. This Kantian abstract formalistic autonomous self is the prototype of what is made more concrete in Hegel’s notion of spirit as universal self-consciousness and Marx’s account of social generic-being. The autonomy of the other would be the prevailing concern of a consistent and rational sociality.

REFERENCES

Adorno, T. W. and Horkheimer, M. 1979. *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (trans: Cumming, J.). London: Verso.

Chalier, C. 2002. *What Ought I to Do?: Morality in Kant and Levinas* (trans. Todd, J. M.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dennett, D. C. 1993. *Consciousness Explained*. London: Penguin.

Derrida, J. 1982. *Margins of Philosophy* (trans: Bass, A.). Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Derrida, J. 2001. *Writing and Difference* (trans. Bass, A.). London: Routledge.

Derrida, J. 2002. Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority' (trans: Quaintance, M.). In *Acts of Religion*, ed. Anidjar, G. London: Routledge.

Feuerbach, L. 1855. *The Essence of Christianity* (trans: Evans, M.). New York: Calvin Blanchard.

Foucault, M. 1977a. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (trans: Sheridan, A.). London: Penguin.

Foucault, M. 1977b. Revolutionary Action: "Until Now" (trans: Bouchard, D. F. and Simon, S.). In *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Bouchard, D.F. Oxford: Blackwell.

Foucault, M. 2007. *The Politics of Truth* (trans: Hochroth, L. and Porter, C.). Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).

Frankfurt, H. G. 1998. *The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frankfurt, H. G. 2002. Reply to Barbara Herman. In *Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt*, eds. Buss, S. and Overton, L. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Hegel, G. W. F. 1971. *Philosophy of Mind* (trans: Wallace, W.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hegel, G. W. F. 1991. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (trans: Nisbet, H. B.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hegel, G. W. F. 1995. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Medieval and Modern Philosophy* (trans: Haldane, E. S. and Simson, F. H.). Lincoln NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Hume, D. 1978. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. 1993. *Critique of Pure Reason* (trans: Meiklejohn, J. M. D.). London: Everyman.

Kant, I. 1996. *Critique of Practical Reason* (trans: Abbot, T. K.). Buffalo: Prometheus.

Kant, I. 2005a. *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (trans: Abbot, T. K.). Peterborough ON: Broadview.

Kant, I. 2005b. What is Enlightenment? (trans: Denis, L.). In *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Denis, L. Peterborough ON: Broadview.

Levinas, E. 1969. *Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority* (trans: Lingis, A.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Levinas, E. 1998. *Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence* (trans: Lingis, A.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Levinas, E. 2006. *Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other* (trans: Smith, M. B. and Harshav, B.). London: Continuum.

Marx, K. 1977. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (trans. Milligan, M.). Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Moore, G. E. 1993. *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sidgwick, H. 1907. *The Methods of Ethics*. London: Macmillan.

Copyright © 2013 Minerva

All rights are reserved, but fair and good faith use with full attribution may be made of this work for educational or scholarly purposes.

Simon Skempton is Lecturer in Philosophy at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.

Email: simonskempton@gmail.com