ISSN 1393-614X Minerva - An Internet Journal of
Philosophy Vol. 10 2006
____________________________________________________
Beyond
Good and Evil (15): Nietzsche’s Critique of Schopenhauer’s ‘Vicious Circle’
Steven Bond |
Abstract
In Beyond Good and Evil, section 15,
Nietzsche offers a criticism of the Kantian contention (inherited by
Schopenhauer) that the external world is but the work of our organs. As such,
he claims, our organs, as part of this world, would by implication also be the
work of our organs. Unless then we are to assume that the concept of a causa sui is not an absurd one, the
external world is, reduction ad absurdum,
not the work of our organs. This paper offers a defence of Schopenhauer from
Nietzsche’s charge of circularity, based on the contention that the apparent
circularity arises only upon the Nietzschean assumption that the transcendental
idealist is, in fact, mistaken in his conception of a transcendental subject.
It is only by assuming that Schopenhauer was mistaken, for example, in
supposing the law of causality to be of a subjective and transcendental nature,
that Nietzsche can even speak about the subject or the world as ‘caused’. A
true grasp of Schopenhauer’s position can only lead to the conclusion that no
causal chain, let alone a circular one, is at play here.
Nietzsche’s error is
diagnosed as arising from a deepening of historical sense, which assumes, from
the outset, that the conceptual categories of the perceiving subject do not
offer us an aeterna veritas. Finally,
Nietzsche’s misconception, and his subsequent inability to diagnose it, arises
from Schopenhauer’s own inability to escape what Wittgenstein terms the
“temporality of our grammar.” Schopenhauer simply does not have the words at
hand to ever remove the notion of temporality from the idea that the subject
and the world ‘create’ each other. Taking cognisance of Schopenhauer’s ‘double
aspect’ theory of the subject, removes from the relationship the notion of
causality upon which Nietzsche’s critique is based.
Nietzsche
claimed that on reading the opening line of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and
Representation (i.e. Die Welt ist
meine Vorstellung), he had felt as though Schopenhauer had written
expressly for him. It is precisely this Kantian belief, however, that the world
is but the product of a perceiving subject, which Nietzsche came to criticise
in section 15 of Beyond Good and Evil.
What is here intended is a largely exegetical account of the extent to which
the mature Nietzsche’s account of the subject is yet an acceptance of
Schopenhauer’s position; to isolate precisely their point of divergence; and to
explicate my own contention that Nietzsche’s criticism of Schopenhauer is
based, firstly, upon a misunderstanding of Schopenhauer’s position and
secondly, upon Nietzsche’s own failure to escape what Wittgenstein had termed
‘the temporality of our grammar’. (1980 22e)
The entire
world of Representation, is, for Schopenhauer, the product of an intellect
which is the practical evolutionary
by-product of the species’ will-to-life. For Schopenhauer, the intellect stands
beside the will in the relation of a tool.
The most striking figure for
the relation of the two is that of the strong blind man carrying the sighted
lame man on his shoulders. (Schopenhauer, 1966b 209)
To quote
Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer sees the mind in biological terms, as
a survival mechanism whose
operations are to be understood only in terms of the functions for which it has
been evolved. (Magee 1983 287)
A single
section entitled ‘Origin of knowledge’, from The Gay Science sufficiently explicates Nietzsche’s position:
Over immense periods of time
the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of these proved to be useful
and helped to preserve the species: those who hit upon or inherited these had
better luck in their struggle for themselves and their progeny... Thus the
strength of knowledge does not depend on its degree of truth but on its age, on
the degree to which it has been incorporated, on its character as a condition
of life. (1974 169)
For both Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche, the world of Representation, that is, the world as perceived by the
intellect, is shaped according to its utility as a condition for the life of
the species. Thus far, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche agree entirely upon the
relationship between representation and will, that is, on the intellect as a
historical, biological tool created for the preservation of the species. That
Nietzsche fails to adopt the phrase ‘Wille
zum Leben’ seems, in this instance, to be of little consequence.
Before we
can mark their point of divergence, we need to be clear about Nietzsche’s own
relationship to the transcendental idealism of Kant. In On Truth and Lying, the early Nietzsche speaks affirmatively of
“the unknowable X of the Thing in itself.” This quote appears as a direct
acceptance of Kant’s noumenon/phenomenon division and of man’s inability to
grasp the noumenon. From this point on, however, it is evident that Nietzsche
becomes increasingly less Kantian. By the publication of the first volume of Human, All Too Human (1878), Nietzsche
had formulated his view of Kant’s transcendental idealism, which changed
little, if at all, thereafter:
Our
feelings of space and time are false, for if they are tested rigorously, they
lead to logical contradictions….. When Kant says “Reason does not create its
laws from nature, but dictates them to her,” this is perfectly true in respect
to the concept of nature which we are obliged to apply to her (Nature = world
as idea, that is, as error), but which is the summation of a number of errors
of reason. (1994 26-27)
According
to Nietzsche, Kant was correct in supposing that the laws of nature are placed
upon the world by man’s faculty of Reason, but Nietzsche rejects Kant’s
assumption that this faculty of Reason (what are for Kant the categories) is an
ahistorical, transcendental faculty. Where Kant’s categories are, as it were,
set in stone, the laws of Nature imposed by Nietzsche’s Reason are those same
elements which develop as a product of the evolutionary survival mechanisms of
a species. Our ideas of time, space, substance, number, the laws of logic etc.
are all imposed upon the world not according to any criterion of truth but
because they have proven beneficial to the preservation of our species. For
Kant, the necessity of the way in which we perceive the external world is
governed by the impossibility of escaping the categories of one’s own intellect
through which we are limited in any such perception. Nietzsche too champions
the necessity of the way in which we perceive the world, but now this necessity
appears as the obligation to accept a concept of nature which is the historical summation of our past errors
of Reason. Thus, in The Will To Power,
Nietzsche clearly demarcates himself from Kant when he claims that it is not
only the case that we possess an intellect out of a practical need, but also
the form of this particular intellect is the product of practical need.
To
what extent even our intellect is a consequence of conditions of existence - :
we would not have it if we did not need
to have it, and we would not have it as
it is if we did not need to have it as
it is, if we could live otherwise.
(Kaufmann, 1967 273)
We are
obliged to a particular interpretation of the world as a result of our
erroneous faith in a Reason that has evolved as a history of species-preserving
errors. That we cannot look around “our own corner” is Nietzsche’s expression
of the problem that Kant had formulated in his account of transcendental
idealism: namely, the subject who provides the conceptual framework which is presupposed
by any possible experience of the world, and is necessarily restricted to this
conceptual framework, cannot extricate himself from his current perspective.
(It was in this regard that Kant’s subject could never become known as an
object to itself.)
In so far
as transcendental idealism refers to the impossibility of the subject’s
escaping those presuppositions of experience imposed by one’s own intellect,
Nietzsche is in agreement with Kant. In so far as it supposes that my current conceptual presuppositions,
through which I find my experience is necessarily filtered, are the definitive
concepts presupposed by the possibility of my having any form of experience, Nietzsche stands vehemently opposed. It
could have been the case, for example, given that man’s Reason evolved in
alternative circumstances, that Kant’s categories would need to be drastically
altered.
Now I wish to further
illustrate that Nietzsche’s eventual break from Schopenhauer’s view of the
subject springs from his naturalisation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. This
naturalisation is itself merely an extension of Schopenhauer’s own critique of
Kant. It is my contention that the core element in the divergence of Nietzsche
from Kant is the strong impetus that Nietzsche places on historical
philosophizing, while Schopenhauer, it would seem at least, lingers
inconsistently between the two positions. For Schopenhauer’s conception of the
subject, we will see, is simultaneously and paradoxically expressive of both
Kant’s transcendentalism and the later historicism of Nietzsche.
A lack of historical sense
is the congenital defect of all philosophers…. They will not understand that
man has evolved, that the faculty of knowledge has also evolved, while some of
them even permit themselves to spin the whole world from out of this faculty of
knowledge…. But everything has evolved; there are no eternal facts, nor are
there any absolute truths. Thus historical philosophizing is necessary
henceforth, and the virtue of modesty as well. (Nietzsche, 1994 14-15)
So states
Nietzsche in Human, All Too Human,
thereby aligning himself with a general 19th century trend towards
the imposition of historical limitations upon what were once held to be eternal
ideals. In an essay entitled Schopenhauerian
Moral Awareness as a Source of Nietzschean Nonmorality, Robert Wicks
identifies Nietzsche’s move “beyond good and evil” as an elaboration upon the
Schopenhauerian ethics of eternal justice under the veil of the 19th
century tendency towards self-conceptions that were “more historically
developmental, more temporarily sequential, more individual context-sensitive,
and less focused upon timeless and unchanging universal concepts, as had been
the prevailing style of the preceding Enlightenment period.” (Wicks, 2002 32)
As one example of this general trend, Wicks offers Hegel’s criticism of Kant as
being too “abstract”, who was in turn criticized by Kierkegaard for ignoring
individual existence in an attempt to develop an absolute philosophical system.
It is clear that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche stand in a similar
relationship to each other. The movement we are hoping to trace is from the
eternal-transcendental to the this-worldly historical.
Firstly,
Schopenhauer criticizes Kant on account of his taking forms of thought as his
philosophical starting point, instead of beginning in the world of perception.
Kant bypasses the grounding of his philosophy in the temporal world of
perception by skipping the problem of “all that is empirically apprehended,
with the phrase “it is given.” He does not ask how it comes about, whether with or without the understanding,
but with a leap passes over to abstract thinking, and not even to thinking in
general, but at once to certain forms of thought.” (1966a 476) Kant clings yet
to the Cartesian rationalism which takes thought as its unquestioned
starting-point, whereas Schopenhauer here exhibits the deepening of 19th
century historical sense by turning his attention to the question of origins
(albeit through the resurrection of Locke’s empiricism). For Nietzsche,
Schopenhauer, in turn, lacks the awareness of origins, evolution and
development that characterises the historical sense of Human, All Too Human. Here, the difference is expressed in
Nietzsche’s comment on what he deems to be Schopenhauer’s excessive scorn of
the then current deification of evolution. For Nietzsche, everything evolves,
and from this standpoint, it would seem that Schopenhauer, who had appeared
historical relative to the steadfast categories of Kant, is entirely lacking in
awareness of historical development:
The deification of evolution
is a metaphysical outlook — as from a lighthouse along the sea of history —
which gave comfort to a generation of scholars who had historicized too much.
One must not become angry about it, however erroneous their idea may be. Only
someone who, like Schopenhauer, denies development and also feels nothing of
the misery of those historical waves; and because he neither knows nor feels
anything of that evolving God or the need to accept him, he can fairly let out
his scorn. (1994 147-148)
Nietzsche’s
remark is well grounded, for Schopenhauer himself conceived of history’s method
as the direct antipode to that of philosophy.
Whereas history teaches us
that at each time something different has been, philosophy endeavours to assist
us to the insight that at all times exactly the same was, is, and will be.
(Schopenhauer, 1966b 441)
It is
obvious that Kant is one of those philosophers Nietzsche had previously
criticized who permits himself to spin the entire world out of a
historically-developed faculty of knowledge. His transcendental idealism
locates the subject, and the conceptual categories that comprise his intellect,
prior to any experience of the world. Whether Nietzsche similarly construed
Schopenhauer in the above-quoted passage as spinning the world from the
subject’s faculty of knowledge remains unclear but if so, it is nevertheless
not the most damning critique of Schopenhauer’s position that Nietzsche offers.
Kant’s position, again, is that the subject is the prerequisite to experience
itself, and experience is possible only through the categories of understanding
that comprise the subject’s intellect. These categories taint Kant with a still
strong sense of Cartesian rationalism, in so far as they are viewed as
ahistorical, as unevolved, as an aeterna
veritas. As such, however, Kant is at least consistent. For Nietzsche,
Kant’s categories, what he now designates as the faculties of reason, are the
collective of history’s species-preserving errors. Thus, while we are still
necessitated to a particular conception of the world, the subject, thus
necessitated, stands as the product of, and not metaphysically prior to, the
world. The subject, and his faculty of reason, are situated prior to the world
as it is being currently perceived by the subject, but this subject has itself
evolved within, and so cannot be metaphysically
prior to the world itself. What Nietzsche here puts forward is Kant’s
transcendental idealism under the lens of a newfound historical sense. Yes, the
subject stands at the limit of the world, but not out of any metaphysical
necessity; rather, he has been actively placed there in the long process of
man’s errors of reason. Thus, in The Will
to Power, we see that man himself is an active participant in creating his
new post-Kantian position at the limit of the world. The subject itself is now
viewed as a historical creation, not as a Kantian aeterna veritas:
We set up a word at the
point at which our ignorance begins, at which we can see no further, e.g., the
word “I,” the word “do,” the word “suffer”: - these are perhaps the horizon of
our knowledge, but not “truths.” (Nietzsche, 1967 267)
Nietzsche
remains consistent to the historical subject, just as Kant had previously
remained consistent with the subject construed as an aeterna veritas. Schopenhauer, however, who prompts Nietzsche’s cultivation
of the historical sense, himself remains at a crossroads between the
metaphysically prior subject of Kant and Nietzsche’s historically evolved
subject, who has been actively self-situated prior to man’s current conception of the world. That
Schopenhauer refers to the Kantian transcendental conditions of experience
(Kant’s ‘Erkenntniβvermögen’)
which he withholds (that is to say, space, time and causality) as ‘Gehirnphänomen’ now becomes of central
importance. It is the first step towards the naturalism of the later Nietzsche
which permitted a move beyond the transcendental idealism of Kant.
In
Schopenhauer’s account of the World as Representation, the subject (“das Auge Alles sieht, nur sich selbst nicht”) is the Kantian unknown X. But it
becomes clear in his account of the World as Will that all this is merely the
product of the organ of the brain and that the intellect is merely the
evolutionary byproduct of the species’ will-to-live. Thus, for Schopenhauer,
the entire world (now just “phenomenon of the brain”) is spun from the faculty of reason (what has now become mere
“brain-functions” (Gehirnfunktionen)),
but this faculty of reason was in turn spun out of the species’ will to survive
in the same world which allegedly presupposes the “brain-functions” of the
subject. It is in the light of this vicious circle that we must read the
following passage in Nietzsche’s Beyond
Good and Evil.
If
one is to pursue physiology with a good conscience one is compelled to insist
that the organs of sense are not
phenomena in the sense of idealist philosophy: for if they were they could not
be causes! Sensualism therefore, at least as a regulative hypothesis, certainly
a heuristic principle. — What? and others even go so far as to say that the
external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a piece of this
external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves
would be – the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete reductio ad absurdum, supposing that the
concept of causa sui is something
altogether absurd. Consequently the external world is not the work of our organs - ? (1973,
§ 15, 27)
Schopenhauer
is not directly mentioned but the passage appears too applicable not to be
directed towards him. Also, the passage which succeeds this opens with a
critique of Schopenhauer as a harmless self-observer who pronounced the
immediate certainty of ““I will”; as though knowledge here got hold of its
object purely and nakedly as “the thing in itself.” (1967 213)
Schopenhauer’s
faith in the thing-in-itself is precisely what binds him, though somewhat
half-heartedly and inconsistently, to the old idealistic philosophy that
Nietzsche has criticised above. A second article by Robert Wicks, this time
bearing the title Schopenhauer’s
Naturalization of Kant’s A Priori Forms of Empirical Knowledge, summarises
that
The brain therefore
structures its structure. This, however, is preposterous. (1993 189)
(Note also that
Wicks deems it superfluous to argue the case of relevance to Schopenhauer.)
Wick’s defence of Schopenhauer involves pinpointing the seeming paradox as the
inevitable result of Schopenhauer’s earlier account of the subjects’
dual-aspect awareness of himself as both transcendentally precedent to and
empirically resultant of the world of matter.
In sum, when Schopenhauer
describes the a priori forms of
empirical knowledge as brain functions, he draws from both aspects of his
dual-awareness of himself as the constructor of his world, and of himself as a being located within this construction. (Wicks,
1993 193)
In line
with Wick’s defence, we can return to a phrase of Schopenhauer’s in which he
stated that
It is just as true that the knower is a product of matter as that matter
is a mere representation of the knower; but it is also just as one-sided.
(Schopenhauer, 1966b 13)
On this account, one is not mistaken in pointing out that Schopenhauer viewed the world as
the product of the subject and the subject in turn as a product of the world,
but one must keep in mind that these opposing truths are each truths from a
single perspective only. Wicks cites the following to push this point home:
It is true that space is
only in my head; but empirically my head is in space. (Wicks 1993 189)
Wicks’
defence is not definitive but points simply to the fact that such
inconsistencies are to be expected in a philosophy of the subject which is
given from alternative standpoints, that is, from the subject of Will (the
knower is a product of matter; empirically my head is in space) and the subject
of Representation (matter is a mere representation of the knower; space is only
in my head).
The
essential point is that Nietzsche’s critique has failed to take account of
Schopenhauer’s dual descriptions of the philosophical subject, that is to say,
of Schopenhauer’s ‘double aspect’ theory of the subject. The subject of
transcendental ideality, the subject as knower, is the Kantian metaphysical
subject that is never object to itself. The subject of empirical reality, the
subject as known, is the subject in respect of which Kant’s “forms of
intuition” become described in physical terms, i.e.,“Gehirnphänomen”. Schopenhauer’s subject is simultaneously that of
transcendental ideality and of empirical reality. Thus, in The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,
Schopenhauer says the following.
Now the identity of the
subject of willing with that of knowing… is the knot of the world (Weltknoten), and hence inexplicable…
whoever really grasps the inexplicable nature of this identity, will with me
call it the miracle “par excellence”. (Neeley, 1997 54)
Kant went
only as far as stating that space belongs to the a priori forms of my sensibility (as Schopenhauer later expresses
it, space is in my head.) For Kant, the subject remained an unknowable X. It is
not until Schopenhauer’s addition that, despite the truth of this, it is
nonetheless empirically true that my head is in space, which amounts to the
same as stating that it is true that the knower remains a product of matter,
that the Kantian unknowable X becomes interchangeable with the world of matter
(i.e., that the ‘I’ becomes the microcosm).
The flaw in
Nietzsche’s critique is that it views the knower’s production of the world of
matter and also, the world of matter’s production of the knowing subject, as
temporally sequential events. Thus we are led to suppose that A causes B causes
A, and so on into a nonsensical infinite regress. Such a regress, however, is
avoidable if one takes cognisance of Schopenhauer’s ‘double aspect’ theory.
From the Fourfold Root, we see that
the two subjects (knower and known) never stand in the causal relation of
object to object. Though the conscious subject is the product of a species’
will to life, it is nonsensical to suppose that the world is thus situated
temporally prior to the conscious subject. It is only with the subject that
time is a priori imposed upon the
world, and it is only from the perspective of a subject, whose intellect is so
structured that he must look out through the lens of time, that the very notion
of cause itself is applicable. The key to understanding why Nietzsche’s
critique is founded upon a perversion of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is the
following excerpt from Schopenhauer’s On
Philosophy and Natural Science:
At
bottom, however, all those events that cosmology and geology urge us to assume
as having occurred long before the existence of any knowing creature are themselves
only a translation into the language of our intuitively perceiving intellect
from the essence in itself of things which to it is incomprehensible. For these
events have never had an existence-in-itself, any more than have present ones.
(Dorman, 1995 14)
To state that the subject is the product
of the world in time entails that one
impose the subject-orientated concept of time upon the world as it is
in-itself. When we meditate on the identity of subject with world, we can only
come to the conclusion that the subject and the world, in the only form in
which it is meaningful to us, must come into existence simultaneously. The
identity of self and world is the very core of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, a
notion whose fundamental status is captured in the description of it as the
knot of the world (Weltknoten). It is
only from the perspective of Nietzsche’s own philosophy — from a fully-fledged
naturalism that believes it has located the historical origins of time, space
and causality in man’s species-preserving errors — that time and causality
could be applied to the pre-subject domain. For Nietzsche, the concept of time
is an error of reason which, if applicable now, must be equally applicable to
the pre-subject and post-subject domains. Only from this point of view can one
remark with sense that the subject both precedes and is preceded by the world
of matter. Schopenhauer never intended that these be taken as two separate
truths, whether taken together or alternately, and which thus lead to the A-B-A
… explanatory infinite regress. The two stand or fall together, both comprising
nothing more than the realisation that the subject as knower and the subject as
known comprise an immediately given identity. Taking cognisance of the
transcendental aspect of Schopenhauer’s subject (the subject as knower), the
attempted location of self and world in any form of temporal sequence is
rendered nonsensical, as one will also grant that ‘before’ the subject (i.e.,
the world as we know it), there is no time of which to speak. Schopenhauer’s
standpoint does not require, as Nietzsche supposes, that the concept of a causa sui not be something fundamentally
absurd. Schopenhauer requires Nietzsche’s acceptance that the very notions of
space, time and causality are applicable only from the subject’s perspective,
never temporally prior to the subject (a phrase which, although nonsensical,
serves to illustrate the point.)
This
reduction of the notion of temporality to the limited playing field of
subjective representation offers us one perspective alternative to the
Nietzschean postulation of a reductio,
which is itself intended to invalidate the idealistic hypothesis of a world
that is but the work of our organs. Such a reductio,
we have said, is invalidated when one takes cognisance of Schopenhauer’s
‘double aspect’ theory of the subject. And it is only through ignoring the
subjective nature of time and causality (itself dependent upon the subject as
Kantian unknown X) that one can fallaciously infer that Schopenhauer views the
subject itself as somehow created within the spatio-temporal world we currently
occupy. The proposed alternative to positing a reductio here begins with the difficulty inherent in extricating
oneself from those pre-requisites of experience, including temporality, which
are provided by the cognitive framework of the Kantian subject. This problem
later finds expression in the philosophy of Wittgenstein as the impossibility
of escaping the temporality of our grammar. As Wittgenstein remarks in Culture and Value,
Philosophers who say: “after
death a timeless state will begin”, or: “at death a timeless state begins”, do
not notice that they have used the words “after” and “at” and “begins” in a
temporal sense, and the temporality is embedded in their grammar.
(Wittgenstein, 1980 22e)
Implicit in
Nietzsche’s remarks of Beyond Good and
Evil, section 15, is the belief that there can be a ‘before’ the subject,
though, for Schopenhauer, it is the separation of the subject from the
undifferentiated thing-in-itself (the Will) that instigates the ‘beginning’ of
time. By the time Nietzsche makes his critique of Schopenhauer, the deepening
trend in what Wicks terms more “temporarily sequential” self-conceptions has
separated Nietzsche entirely from Kant’s a
priori forms of space, time and causality. That Schopenhauer, like Kant
before him, erred on this account is actually presupposed by Nietzsche’s
attempt to prove that he did so. Because it is only by assuming that
Schopenhauer’s naturalism is underdeveloped — that, for example, causality, the
last of Kant’s twelve categories, is also of historical origin (i.e., that
Schopenhauer was wrong to say it is of a
priori origin) — that Nietzsche can even speak about the subject or the
world as ‘caused’. Of course, this is by no means anything approaching an
affirmation of Schopenhauer’s more transcendental stance, which is an essential
component of his ‘double aspect’ theory. We need not, however,
unproblematically assume Schopenhauer’s ‘double aspect’ theory to be
philosophically correct in order to defend it from a Nietzschean attack that is
itself circular in nature. I wish here only to rebut Nietzsche’s criticism by
virtue of the fact that Schopenhauer’s position must be presupposed false,
before it can, without delving into nonsense, be thus criticised. Indeed,
Nietzsche’s misconception, and Wicks’ inability to diagnose it, can be seen to
arise from Schopenhauer’s own inability to escape what Wittgenstein terms the
“temporality of our grammar.” While it would be incorrect to attribute to
Schopenhauer a variant of Wittgenstein’s later argument, which is made in an
unrelated context, Wittgenstein’s remark is nevertheless relevant. It provides
us with a clear expression of the difficulty involved in removing oneself from
the world of subjective temporality, which Schopenhauer’s reference to a world
‘before the existence of any knowing creature’ entails. Indeed, rather than
representing a resolution to the problem that Schopenhauer himself may have
offered, Wittgenstein’s remark instead presents us with an inescapable problem
to which Schopenhauer was himself subject. Furthermore, it provides us with one
explanation as to why a ‘vicious circle’ (which this author deems non-existent)
seemed apparent to Nietzsche at all. Schopenhauer simply does not have the
words at hand to ever remove the notion of temporality from the idea that the
subject and the world ‘create’ each other, though it is clear from On Philosophy and Natural Science above
that, in this instance, temporality is not applicable.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Guyer, P. and A.W. Wood (ed.), 1998. Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason,
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Nietzsche, F., 1973. Beyond Good and Evil (trans. R.J. Hollingdale).
Nietzsche, F., 1974. The Gay Science,
Nietzsche, F., 1994. Human, All
Too Human,
Schopenhauer, A., 1966a. The World as Will and Representation,
1st vol.,
Schopenhauer, A., 1966b. The World
as Will and Representation, 2nd vol.,
Wittgenstein,
L., 1980. Culture and Value,
Secondary Texts
Dorman, S., 1995. Towards a
Principle of All Explanation: Schopenhauer’s Will and Nietzsche’s Will to Power.
M.A. Thesis, Queen’s
Magee, B., 2000. The Philosophy of
Neeley, G.S., 1997. “Schopenhauer and the
Limits of Language” Idealistic Studies.,
27(1/2), 47-67.
Nussbaum, M.C., 1999. “Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus”, in: The
Wicks, R., 1993. “Schopenhauer’s
Naturalization of Kant’s A Priori Forms of Empirical Knowledge,” History of Philosophy Quarterly., 10(2),
181-196.
Wicks, R., 2002. “Schopenhauerian Moral Awareness as a Source of
Nietzschean Nonmorality,” Journal of
Nietzsche Studies., 23, 21-38.
Copyright
© 2006 Minerva
All
rights are reserved, but fair and good faith use with full attribution may be
made of this work for educational or scholarly purposes.
Steven Bond recently completed
a Ph.D. in Philosophy (Tractarian Holism: Transcendental Solipsism in the
Context of the Kantian Tradition) at
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