

Dualism and Progress in Kant and Nietzsche

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Abstract

Antagonism in human relations has been recognised since the beginning of Western history and has been acknowledged as its driving and progressive force. But how exactly do contest, competition, and war contribute to the historical progress of humankind? Coming from the position that there are timeless truths in human history and that there is a human nature, in this paper I examine Kant's notion of unsocial sociability from his *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* and how this notion relates to human progress. I explain the Kantian notion of the dynamics of history, his 'unsocial sociability', and critique its problematic relation to his telos of nature: the formation of a universal civil union in perpetual peace. In order to address this problem of dynamic-telos disparity I go back to the beginnings of Western history, the ancient Greeks, with Nietzsche as a guiding mind. Focusing on his essay *Homer on Competition* and also his book, *The Birth of Tragedy* I examine his uncovering of Greek 'truth' in relation to the division of Being in a primordial strife into beings of two opposing forms, the Apollonian and Dionysian. I consider how these dual impulses were channelled, according to Nietzsche, into constructive social competitions and characterised the development and flourishing of Greek culture. I argue that Nietzsche's view of human development and progress, via a republic of geniuses, overcomes the Kantian disparity between the dynamic of history and nature's end.

I. IMMANUEL KANT'S NOTIONS OF UNSOCIAL SOCIABILITY AND PROGRESS

During the Renaissance and the Enlightenment political theorists came from one of two traditions, either idealism, which involved thinking and promoting an ideal utopian state, or realism, which involved taking into account real-world power struggles when thinking about political reality. Thought on the ideal utopian state or power-struggles can be related to opposing theories of knowledge, such as rationalism and empiricism, or old divisions between thinkers such as Plato and Thrasymachus, or the ancient split of *nomos*, culture from *physis*, nature. The nature and culture relation, or *physis* and *nomos*, is a

distinction that is at the roots of political philosophy. Nature is the ‘character’ or ‘way of being’ of humanity or human groups for example, and emphasises similarities. Cultural convention is the rules and norms created by and imposed upon individuals that shape how human nature is expressed in social behaviour. In *The Republic* Plato orchestrates this division by showing that Socratic political rationalism defends Natural right, associated with nature or *physis*, such that human beings are seen to have a noble and rational nature and the good life can be achieved by traditional conventions. In defence of the opposite view, conventionalism, which is associated with culture or *nomos*, Plato lays out the views of the Sophists, Thrasymachus and Calicles. These two individuals conceived that human nature is ruled by the passions and people live according to the natural law of self-preservation (Plato, translated by MacDonald, 1969, Bk. I, Chp. III).

What Immanuel Kant attempts to do with his political theory is bring the utopian and the real-world power-struggles together into a coherent system of thought. In other words, he wants to bridge the nature-nurture, *physis-nomos* distinction and ground his political idealism in human nature. Kant published his essay *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* in 1784, which was a pretext to his famous essay *Perpetual Peace* (1795). In the former, he outlines his speculative philosophy of history and he struggles with the significance of universal history and historical events and what these implied for future political arrangements. He starts with a statement about nature determining everything, including the free will of rational human beings. He wants the historian to explain freely willed human actions according to natural law and show them to be progressive. This is because even though individual human action looks disorderly and irregular in appearance, according to Kant it is actually, “*in the large*”, the development of the “original predispositions” of the whole species (Rorty and Schmidt, 2009, p.10). For him the pursuit of self-interests, our aims, often in conflict, is an unconscious promotion of a natural end, such that the course of individual human advance is intended by nature. This pursuit of our ends is neither instinctual nor a mutually agreed upon

rational plan as it often involves “folly”, “childish vanity”, “malice”, and destructiveness (Ibid, p.10). In this way, the philosopher cannot “presuppose any rational *aim*” of individual or collective actions, rather he has to attempt to discover an aim or purpose in nature *behind* the senseless course of human events (Ibid, p.11). He has to decide whether it is possible to formulate a definite plan of nature for human beings who act without a plan of their own, and, if so, uncover a guiding principle of human history.

Kant thought that there indeed was an underlying and hidden mechanism of history; a dynamic principle of historical progress that was a civilizing process.¹ Kant thought that human nature was a paradox — human beings were both gregarious and self-interested — and he termed this paradox “unsocial sociability”. This paradoxical nature is the hidden mechanism of history. Its proper definition, according to Bielefeldt (2003, p.131) is as follows: an individual is “driven by a social inclination, he seeks the company of others, a company, however, that he sometimes finds difficult to bear”. People *seek* social relationships for a variety of reasons, such as the attainment of social identity or esteem, power, glory, and cooperate for the attainment of basic needs. In this way, people are social precisely because they want to fulfill their own ends and are unconcerned about the interests of others, often using them as a means to their ends. In other words, each individual harbours the “unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with own ideas” (Rorty and Schmidt, 2009, p.13) and is in ‘resistance’ to the self-seeking of other individuals, “a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society” (Kant, 1784 cited in Bielefeldt, 2003, p.131). People enter into society for self-seeking reasons and resist the self-seeking of others, which produces an antagonistic social experience.

As healthy individuals, human beings are social, friendly and dependent as well as unsocial, solitary and independent; people oscillate with one another, in concord and discord, harmony and friction, peace and conflict, agreement and argument. This

antagonistic social experience of conflicting interests and intermingling can result in precarious dramas that can cause anguish, despair, and even death from violent conflict and war. Yet, rather than this self-seeking, antagonism, and resistance only causing debilitating social conflict Kant points out that the unsocial qualities of human beings can and do have positive public consequences. Conflict can be competitive and beneficial to society. Bielefeldt explains that Kant argues conflicts are “a precondition for the development of the individual as well as the species”; they can act as catalysts for the progress of civilization “by shaking human beings out of their lazy self-sufficiency” (2003, pp.131-132). Or, as Kant wrote, it is the “desire for honor, power, or property” and the seeking of status that cultivates man to become civilized; it is the “vices of culture”, such as “envy, jealousy, ingratitude”, “asocial qualities” that reveal hidden talents which would otherwise remain dormant in a peaceful and harmonious society (Kant, 1784 cited in Bielefeldt, 2003, p.132). By the impulse of mutual emulation, a constant comparison with others, people become more perfect by competing and cultivating innate potentials that otherwise would lay undeveloped. For Kant, the resistance between individuals in society and the disparities between human nature and social behaviour, awakens all human powers, reveals hidden talents, and develops all the potentials, in time, which the human species have to exhibit. This creative yet unsocial aspect of human beings is the foundation for culture, science, and politics; social progress occurs because of it but as an unintended consequence.

The dynamic social conflict of interests is not just a free for all in civil society, but is regulated by mutual recognition, self-discipline, and cooperation such that the destructive power of conflict is contained and progress occurs. In this way the primordial drive of unsocial sociability in civil society under a social contract is limited in its free-play of inclination and action and tends towards the good. For Kant, “in the end”, the tension of social relations must be “the cause of all lawful order among men” (Dupré, 1998, p.817). Kant’s future cosmopolitan ideal, the federation of states in perpetual peace, is the

teleological notion that he perceives nature intends for humankind. History has a plan for human beings. This intended natural purpose of human beings is beyond individual self-interest; instead, the telos of humanity is a just and universal civil society and it is the unsocial qualities of man that are the necessary drives for us to solve the problem of attaining these social conditions. In this way, the desire and pursuit of power, property, honour, immaterial wants and needs, social status, and social esteem, which lead to and fuels conflict between individuals and nations, can lead to “new capacities and new forms of social cooperation”, such as a universal civil union and the world federation of states (O’Neill, 2008, p.531). According to Kant then, human progress happens by way of the antagonism of human relations and is defined as a civilizing process which transforms free men and a barbaric existence into a civilized and free civil state under external laws. In the same fashion, the relations of nations to each other develop from a characteristically Hobbesian state of nature condition to a civilized and peaceful co-existence under a universal law.

An emphasis on peace was a must for Kant for culture to survive. Yet if social relations are defined by antagonism and this dynamic is the cause of progress towards nature’s intended end for humanity, we have a problem. Kant argues that the telos of universal history is perpetual peace, which implies the disappearance of the dynamic of social history i.e. unsocial sociability. We are left with the question of what exactly happens to this antagonistic drive in the ideal cosmopolitan state. If we understand several points that Kant described as being related to the goal of history, we may understand this arrangement better. For Kant, peace in pastoral existence is not what man had himself achieved and so it was not a worthy source of happiness. Human beings had to make themselves worthy by working towards peace; happiness was attainable only by effort. It was only through antagonistic social relations, in the efforts of individuals to emulate or outdo others in competition, that human progress occurred and guided men towards peace in a universal civil union of free men. Developing the full potential of human beings and

humanity required regulated vain-glorious and self-interested competition and contest between individuals, and, Kant adds, war between nations. In this way, the necessary conditions for human progress to occur are evil conditions, such as war, inequality, and mass-poverty, which would be ameliorated in time.ⁱⁱ

Another way of understanding this is that “[a]s Kant insisted” according to G.B. Madison, “[a]ll culture, art which adorns mankind, and the finest social order are fruits of unsociableness, which forces itself to discipline itself” (p.95). Inequality and social evils are what allow for the outcomes of the artistic endeavours of an elite minority that channel their energy into the “less necessary branches of culture, science and art” (Louden, 2000, p.154). These branches of art and science are what makes societies civilized, regulates the conflict and progressively transforms human social institutions towards nature’s end – universal civil society – and at the same time, leads to self-mastery and discipline and thus removes the necessary antagonistic qualities that were the ladder that elevated human society in the first place. Conflict and war to Kant is the way in which nature “further[s] the development of human beings’ capacities and talents against their own wishes” yet become ameliorated, in time, because they were the means, and not the end, of progress (Ibid, p.154). War will eventually die out because the improvement, over time, of awful conditions is due to the rational guidance of antagonistic human nature by just civil institutions towards a definite goal in the future, “an international community allowing for this competition or rivalry, but under the rule of law” (Sweet, 2004, p.7). In this way, conflict is regulated such that it is constructive and contributes to peace. It can be transcended by the guidance of “a rationality capable of expressing the world in terms of *lawfulness*” (Fillion, 2008, p.47). The progressive improvement of society and the perfection of man towards a final and natural end do not mean the disappearance of our unsocial drives; rather it means they are sublimated and regulated under law. But to what degree will our unsocial nature be regulated under law in an ideal society? To the point that there is no more progress? Kant is not explicit on

this point. If there are no conflicts that sustain creativity in human society will this not lead to the decline of society rather than result in perpetual peace?

In order to better understand this problem, the reader has to acknowledge the fact that Kant rejected pessimistic accounts of history as decline and of theories of oscillation between good and evil, for to him this would be Sisyphean striving without hope. His political philosophy tends towards the eudaimonistic or chiliastic vision of a better future, a unification of the human race under a world government and he argues that we have a duty to believe and work towards this ideal. It is not that the future ideal state of humanity will happen, or that it is inevitable, but it is a possibility that could occur by the collective efforts of human beings. The impossibility of progress has not been proved yet progress cannot be said to be inevitable because of variable historical evidence and the temporariness of eras. We cannot tell if we are progressing or not. But Kant does insist that there is “empirical evidence” available that progress is indeed happening, from the comparison of civilized society with the state of nature, or with barbaric societies, and he argues that we have a moral duty to believe in progress and in finding ways of perpetuating and accelerating it (Dupré, 1998, p.819).ⁱⁱⁱ Kant considers that human beings in his age had developed the capacity to consider optimistically what the purpose of human beings was, i.e. to live in a universal civil society, and the progress towards this end ought to now be the intention of individual action, such that human beings align their self-interests purposively towards furthering and quickening the arrival of this end. In this way, human beings may now direct history towards a definite goal, in effect, controlling their collective destiny.

In the past, previous to the time of Kant,^{iv} human beings had no idea or had little interest in how their actions affected the bigger scheme of things for the human species, but, there were spin-offs, unintended beneficial consequences for the social good from individuals pursuing their self-interests. By actively participating in the idea that history is rational,

it becomes realised as such, such that being involved and believing in the idea makes it happen, we create it so; we act in accordance to an idea and are committed to bring it about. This is a practical step that we can and do make towards making progress towards the idea of a future universal civil society happen or even accelerate its happening.

The disparity between Kant's dynamics of history and nature's end for humanity still remains a problem. The hope that he has in a future order of peace and world federation of states is not enough to explain the disappearance or complete sublimation of the antagonistic quality of human relations into constructive development. If the world federation of states is indeed the end that nature intends for human beings, then it is a final state in which no antagonistic qualities can exist and thus there can be no further human development. It can be said that perpetual peace will be the actual end, i.e. decline and death of humanity. In the next part of this essay I explore Nietzsche's philosophy in order to give an alternative view to this Kantian view of progress and a future human condition. I will attempt to show that Nietzsche's ideas about the future of the human race — that competition between creative individuals in a 'republic of geniuses' propels or stimulates the evolution of the human race indefinitely — clear up the disparity between Kant's social dynamic and his telos.

II. DUALISM AND PROGRESS IN FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

The historical tradition mentioned at the beginning of the essay, of the divisions between nature and nurture, between idealism and realism, are dualities that Nietzsche roots in nature itself. In his two works as mentioned above he refers to the pre-Homeric and Homeric Greeks as having a dual human nature, constituting what he calls Apollonian and Dionysian impulses. He also explains that the antagonistic quality of these ancestors of ancient Greece became channelled into creative genius in the tragic age and led to the evolution of Western society, from barbarism to civilization.

The origin of society, for Nietzsche, was a site of brutal struggle and violence. In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche writes about the culture of the Greeks as having a dual character of existence defined by perpetual strife. This conflict stemmed from a primordial struggle that is the “locus for a series of structural oppositions” (Wilson, 2005, p.186). This original struggle is defined as Dionysian, a force of nature that divides and binds beings into relations of tension; the whole is a tense engagement of opposites. In this way Being is “radically heterogeneous”, it is strife (Wilson, 2005, p.198). The structural oppositions Nietzsche refers to are characterised by two types of strife/discord or *eris*: destructive/bad and constructive/good. The destructive becomes constructive discord in ancient Greece and gives rise to the flourishing of culture and thus, to Western civilization. The first type of *eris* is linked to the Dionysian impulse, which is a cosmic *agonism* that permeates and defines all things, and separated Being into beings “through differentiation” (Ibid, p.195). Ontological strife is Dionysian at its core, terrifying and chaotic. The Dionysian *eris* is a natural impulse towards bloody and wicked war and feuding between individuals and states and this primordial struggle defines the pre-civil state of human nature and of life itself.

In *Homer on Competition* Nietzsche portrays pre-Homeric ancient Greek society as arising and separating itself from this Dionysian struggle of death and destruction, from “the dark horrors of its past by developing a system of laws” (Wilkerson, 2006, p.72). The “natural impulse to struggle” was “redirected” inwardly such that the barbaric instinct was cultivated in such a way that it promoted a cultural and political identity. This channelling of the *agonal* energy of the barbaric instinct inwardly promoted new forms of desire and motivation; the Greeks “struggle[d] amongst themselves in ways that sustained and even reinforced the bonds of the cultural unit” (Ibid, p.76). The Greeks distinguished themselves from those they deemed barbarians — mostly every other state or society — separated themselves from their horrifying history of bloody struggle, and

extended their self-interests beyond the individual into society. The Dionysian conflict was transformed into an Apollonian strife, which is a political form of tension that develops social institutions and communities and requires competitive discord between the passionate ambition and self-interests of individuals.

Agonism stems from the word *agon*, which means “bringing together” (Wilson, 2005, p.206). Nietzsche’s good *eris* is this ‘bringing together’ into a community. It is the “jealousy, hatred, and envy” of men that “spurs men to activity... [to] fights which are *contests*” (Kaufmann, 1976, p.35). The annihilating Dionysian strife becomes channelled into “socially productive forms”; it becomes institutionalised as Apollonian competition, as constructive strife in Greek society (Wilson, 2005, p.206). As Ansell-Pearson aptly says, “it is the contest (*agon*) (in politics, in the arts, in sport, and in festival) which serves to sublimate and channel the fearful and aggressive impulses of human nature, ensuring that the individual drives promote the ‘welfare of the whole, of the civic society’. Every Athenian ‘was to cultivate [his] ego in contest, so that it should be of the highest service to Athens and should do the least harm” (Ansell-Pearson, 1994, cited in Wilkerson, 2006, p.76). In this way, these ancient Greeks transformed barbaric struggle while affirming the necessity of struggle and its meaning. They exhibited a tense balance, or what Wilkerson calls a “glorious mixture” between their Apollonian and Dionysian impulses (Wilkerson, 2006, p.67).

The *agonal* Dionysian instinct was transformed and channelled into Greek art, philosophical systems of thought and philosophical types; it led to prosperity during the tragic age. It was internalised, which led to intellectual contest, the seeking out of weaknesses in opponents’ arguments and works, and became a creative force. By being transformed into creative energy, the *agonal* instinct nourished Hellenic culture; this role of struggle in Greek history morphed from a “struggle-unto-death” in pre-Homeric times to a “struggle to become great” during Homer’s era and the Greek age of tragedy. In this

way the Dionysian destructive *eris* produced the inspiration for productivity, its sublimation into “feelings of envy, ambition, and ‘competition’”, into Apollonian *eris*, resulted in social beneficence and prosperity that contributes to the overall health of the state and the human species (Ibid, p.79). Rather than being shrouded with a destructive emphasis, strife is illustrated as a governing force that constructively shapes the formation of culture and state and cultivates the creative genius.

For Nietzsche the creative genius was the pinnacle of humanity, and the means by which the human species evolved. In order to understand his view of the creative genius and the role it played in Greek society we have to understand the nature of limited competition in Greek society. When the Dionysian impulse became sublimated into Apollonian strife, limited competitions arose from nature placing boundaries on itself in the forms of art and state. Warfare became ritualised, aestheticized, and limited such that “agonistic norms operated as an organising matrix” formalising the zero-sum paradigm of agonism throughout social, cultural, and political practices in 7th century BC Ionia (Sandywell, 2000, p.94). These limited forms of competition occurred in an *agon*, such as “the law-court, the theatre and the assembly” (Wilson, 2005, p.206). Social cohesion arose from this type of collective competition; there was a shift from “the conflict of blood” to what Wilson calls “the conflict of accounts” or arguments regarding what is just and good in the court, theatre and assembly (2005, p.206).^v

The Greeks limited themselves in two ways, by scapegoating and by ostracism, drawing the distinction of man from the “bestial and from the godly” and eliminating those that drew too close to one or the other (Ibid, p.212). The limits were not to be crossed, as it was believed that it would bring the wrath of evil from below or above on the person, and even the society. Those that were ostracised were seen to invite wrath from above (i.e. the gods, or pure Apollonian). Those that were scapegoated were seen to invite wrath from below (i.e. from the monstrous nature of Dionysius). In this way, human can only fight

human, and none can arise above and attempt to fight the gods. This divine distinction that is laid and limits the contest is important for the distinction between good or constructive *eris* and bad or destructive *eris*, the dual character of nature.

This dualism can be understood in terms of what are the “finest” and the most “terrible” aspects of human practices and humanity itself. In *Homer on Competition* Nietzsche uses similes of a carnivorous predatory animal, the tiger, and five “real and artistic” examples to emphasise the darker, violent, destructive and cruel character of human nature. In this way, Wilson explains, Nietzsche revealed a “horrible truth” about the beginnings of western civilization, the existence of primal violence that shaped ancient Greek cultural development. It was a truth that was apparently “veiled out of necessity during the Greek pinnacle of cultural creativity” (Ibid, p.184). Art is the form that nature takes when defined in terms of conflict and when this conflictual nature produces a different product via the “channelling” of this “destructive and violent strife” into “a creative outlet” (Ibid, p.186). This channelling can be understood as a concealment of a truth, the “terrifying element to our existence”, by “aesthetic deception” (Ibid, p.186). The tragic nature of a meaningless and horrible existence is transcended by Art.

Nietzsche refers to two types of artistic deception, that of the “children of the night”, or the Dionysian impulse of “natural, limitless and aimless violent strife”, and that of the “lighter, gentler and warmer” Apollonian impulse which veils the first (Ibid, p.192). The union of these two artistic deceptions is what Wilson calls the “creative affirmation” that characterised the Greeks of the tragic age. This tragic culture was authentic precisely because the Greek genius creatively affirmed life and acknowledged and justified the Dionysian impulse. The tragic culture was an experience that reshaped the natural chaos by “veiling and limiting” it; nature itself channelled strife into social institutions and “limited competition” (Ibid, p.193). For without this balance, the human being can

become thoroughly Dionysian; man can become “pre-Homeric” and return to a savage state, “cruel”, “godless”, and “evil” (Kaufman, 1976, p.39).

The veiling manoeuvre that conceals the “horrible truth” behind Greek culture is “proper to human nature and enables its highest achievements” (Wilson, 2005, p.186).^{vi} The political arrangement of society is a positive fiction, a “noble lie” which holds that the community is one; it is a necessary concealment of the horrifying blood-thirsty Dionysian forces behind the origins of Greek society (Ibid, p.200). The reason why this concealing is a positive and noble act is that it hides the truth on behalf of the “common good of the political community” and thus “furthers nature’s end” i.e. the development of the creative genius (Ibid, p.200). In this way, art and culture are “deceptions” created by nature so that it may “overcome itself” (Ibid, p.188).^{vii} Cultural institutions are grounded in the natural and are a way for nature to express and fulfill itself. Not all cultures are adequate to do this job; some cultures are shaped in “equal measure” by the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses and are thus more in tune with nature’s ends, i.e. “the production of the creative individual or genius” (Ibid, p.189). The creative genius then uses the Apollonian impulse as a veil to hide the terrifying Dionysian nature. Those individuals that were in the balance between Dionysian and Apollonian impulses, i.e. the tragic-philosophers, understood that the limits of a particular society were arbitrary and they placed their own boundaries around the Dionysian core. The artist-philosopher as ‘creative genius’ can go beyond a particular *polis* and its limited competitions, but creative geniuses do not become ostracised and lose membership in a community; instead they come together and form their own community, a community of creative minds or a ‘republic of geniuses’. Unlike those that become ostracised and collapsed under hubris such as Miltiades who incited the envy of the gods, creative geniuses in the tragic age discovered a different stage of competition without fighting with the gods. They remained human; they maintained a balance between their Apollonian and Dionysian impulses and thus preserved their humanity, inciting upon themselves neither evil below nor evil above, but

cohesion with other great individuals. Knowledge is not, according to Wilson's account of Nietzsche, the object of the genius philosopher or poet, but the "advancement of nature, the advancement of life through its highest specimens" (2005, p.126). The creative genius is the means by which human society evolves.

To link back to the issue raised above regarding the problem of the Kantian dynamic of history, unsocial sociability, and the *telos* he proposes, the universal civil society in perpetual peace, we can see that Nietzsche overcomes this with the view of the republic of geniuses. Wilson says that Nietzsche opposes Kant's vision of the end of nature being a final *telos* of a perfect universal civil society as it would "efface the co-defining tensions and contests essential to cultural identity" (Ibid, p.218). This is because a world where there is no distinction from the outcomes of conflict would be a world of convention, uniformity, and standardization resulting in the decline of a civilization, much like the decline of Greek culture from cosmopolitanism. The healthy state is one that flourishes from a balance struck between Apollonian and Dionysian impulses without being in excess of either one and which allows for the conditions for nature to fulfill her end in the creative genius. Nature produces the state and its competitive institutions and culture, which foster the superior individual, and fulfills its perpetual end in this creative genius, who continues, via the competition between geniuses, the furtherance of the species.

III. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Kant and Nietzsche's accounts of history and the drive of progress are similar in that they both view the human being as being motivated by the passions and that these passions are sublimated into a civil society such that they benefit the public good. Both of them perceive human beings as having a dual nature, unsocial sociability or Apollonian and Dionysian impulses and that the tense conflict between these

oppositions is a primordial force that leads to human progress. They both also explain how it is that destructive conflict is channelled into constructive antagonism and that nature intends an end for humanity that is to be fulfilled by competitive conflict in either a perfect civil union or the republic of geniuses and the evolution of society. Finally, they both attempt to bridge the nature-nurture distinction that defines much of Western thought.

Unlike his predecessors, Kant sees that 'evil' individual inclinations and the conflict that ensues are what drive personal and social improvement, progress. In this way, Kant is arguing for a human nature that is based on a law of nature, about how we are. He also argues for the possibility of progress and so for his moral philosophy. His normative philosophy, what we should do, makes sense if we believe in progress and direct our ends as a part of a whole towards a future state of humankind. He attempts to unite nature and nurture, rationalism and empiricism, idealism and realism, in a way that is grounded in human imagination and reality. His attempt fails precisely because what he deems as the dynamics of history, human unsocial sociability, seems to disappear in his end of nature, a view that is problematic because there is no adequate argument that clearly explains what happens to this antagonistic quality in a state of perpetual peace. It also results in the view that nature intends an end that is the actual end of humanity. Nietzsche overcomes this problematic teleology that Kant proposes by arguing for a 'republic of geniuses' that indefinitely furthers the evolution of the human species. He also grounds Kant's notion of the dual nature of human beings in a primordial strife that governs all things in existence and thus rooting it in nature itself. He does not consider human beings and culture as separate from nature, but as the products of nature, and thus characterises them with the dual impulses of Apollonian and Dionysian discord. This discord is an eternal feature of human beings precisely because it is, in itself, nature; we can not escape our natural roots and thus are forever in a state of perpetual strife. This strife, if channelled into the limited competition of intellectual geniuses whom conceal the horrible Dionysian 'truth' of

existence from the public, can facilitate the ongoing constructive development of humanity towards an optimistic future, a creative overcoming of the human condition.

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Notes

ⁱ Robert Louden identifies five types of drives that Kant says are behind progress: unsocial sociability, the spirit of trade, government, education, and religion. The chief means of human progress is unsocial sociability which this essay focuses on. For further discussion of these five drives of progress see Robert B. Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings*, (USA; Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.156-157.

ⁱⁱ Here think about the rise of the arts and sciences (David Hume) and also the requirement of a mass of working poor or slaves for arts and sciences to emerge from leisure and freedom. Slavery or mass of working poor is necessary for leisure and the development of arts and sciences, and thus progress in the social realm, including freedom for all and the development of human rights and law; there can be no justice without injustice. Another note: war and the enemy produce group cohesion and solidarity. A common goal brings people together and also gives people a common identity, membership, protection, security, reliance and dependency.

ⁱⁱⁱ Even though civil society is intellectually progressive, Kant insisted that civil society is not necessarily morally progressive.

^{iv} Even before Christianity, i.e. the pagans and barbarians, the nomads and the individuals prior to civilization.

^v It is important to note here that during the height of the Greek age Athens became a center of a slave economy. The transition from the victors of battle killing all men and enslaving the women and children to one in which the men, women, and children were all enslaved, sold or used by the victors to carry out manual labour, housework, entertainment and such is noteworthy. In conjunction to the Dionysian impulse becoming sublimated or transformed into good *eris* and cultural development including sports, politics, poetry, drama, and philosophy, how booty was treated by the victorious in war is a significant occurrence at this time. A mass of slaves allowed the citizens of Greece time to pursue higher interests; they had the free time, away from manual labour, to labour in their curiosities, i.e. philosophy, politics, the arts, and the sciences. In this way, the agonistic ethic, or the channelling of the warrior ethic into institutionalised social good is inseparable from the changing tactics of warfare, the transition of killing to enslaving men. Culture, in the sense of Greek culture, the roots of Western civilization, can be said to possibly not have occurred if this slight increase in the humane treatment of human war-booty did not take place. Without slavery, or a mass of working poor, there can be no cultural development. The products of high culture depend on the few who have time on their hands to develop these aspects; it depends on those that have the freedom to pursue these interests and have mastery over others. Can we talk about a barbarous genius? Can we only talk about the genius in a society that enables a few to have their basic material needs covered by the labour of others and thus have the conditions to excel in one cultural area or another?

^{vi} See James C. Scott on euphemisms, the concealment of an underlying meaning in words, language, and action. i.e. power relations discourse, denotative and connotative meanings of discourse and practice in his

Prestige as the Public Discourse of Domination in Cultural Critique: Discursive Strategies and the Economy of Prestige, no.12, spring 1989.

^{vii} Nietzsche sees man as being self-interested and experiencing limitless strife, and, at the same time, he sees human nature as tending towards standards of behaviour, limits created by competition itself. Nietzsche is between the Sophistic and the Socratic distinction of *physis* and *nomos* in the sense that he sees that *nomos* is relative to the particular conditions of the moment yet is grounded in nature, in *physis*, which is our foundation. He thought that culture stems from nature, from our nature and that cultural rules, norms, and standards, ought to be aligned to nature's end, which is the "production of genius" and the "overcoming of our terrifying, Dionysian existence" (Wilson, 2005, p.222). Nietzsche held that the distinction between *physis* and *nomos*, and between Socratic and Sophistic conceptions of human nature and humanity, "is to be embraced as a locus of questioning and dialogue" (Ibid, p.180). It is a dialectical dynamic.

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